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vABSTRACT
Like other ordinary contracts, construction contracts are created when two 
parties, either between employers and contractors, contractor and supplier, or other 
combinations, mutually agree to a transaction. A contract may outwardly appear to 
satisfy all the requirements of a valid contract, but on closer examination the minds of 
the contracting parties are poles apart in respect of the terms of the contract. Such lack of 
genuineness may lead a construction contract to become void or voidable. According to 
Sweet (2000), it is difficult to determine the validity and voidability of a contract in the 
construction industry. There are circumstances which can cause a construction contract 
to become void or voidable, and those circumstances may not be easy to be determined. 
Hence, this dissertation intends to identify on what circumstances a construction contract 
will be rendered void or voidable. This dissertation was carried out mainly through 
documentary analysis of law journals. Meanwhile, due to time constraint, questionnaire 
survey and interviews were not carried out. There are six (6) circumstances have been 
identified which may render a construction contract voidable; and at the same time, 
another six (6) circumstances have been identified which may render a construction 
contract void. This dissertation perhaps is not comprehensive, it is, however, hoped that 
it may provides some rough ideas or guidelines for the parties in the construction 
industry when determining whether or not a construction contract is void, or voidable.  
vi
ABSTRAK
Seperti kontrak biasa yang lain, kontrak-kontrak pembinaan dibentuk apabila dua 
pihak, sama ada di antara majikan dengan kontraktor, kontraktor dengan pembekal, atau 
kombinasi-kombinasi yang lain, bersetuju bersama-sama dalam satu transaksi. Satu 
janjian mungkin pada mukanya telah mencapai semua keperluan untuk menjadi kontrak 
yang sah, tetapi kalau diperiksa dengan lebih mendalami, pemikiran pihak-pihak yang 
berkontrak mungkin berlainan berkenaan dengan terma-terma kontrak. Kekurangan pada 
kejatian ini mungkin akan menyebabkan sesuatu kontrak pembinaan menjadi batal atau 
boleh batal. Menurut Sweet (2000), adalah memang susah untuk menentukan kesahihan 
dan kebolehbatalan sesuatu kontrak dalam industri pembinaan. Terdapat keadaan-
keadaan yang mungkin menyebabkan sesuatu kontrak pembinaan menjadi bartal atau 
boleh batal, and keadaan-keadaan itu adalah tidak mudah ditentukan. Maka, dissertasi 
ini bertujuan untuk mengenalpasti keadaan-keadaan di mana satu kontrak pembinaan 
dijadikan batal atau boleh batal. Dissertasi ini dilaksanakan melalui analisis laporan 
undang-undang, manakala memandangkan masa yang terhad diperuntukkan, kajian 
borang selidik dan temuramah tidak dijalankan. Dalam kajian ini, enam (6) keadaan, 
yang dapat menjadikan suatu kontrak pembinaan boleh batal, telah dikenal pasti. Dan, 
pada masa yang sama, enam (6) keadaan pula, yang dapat menjadikan suatu kontrak 
pembinaan batal, telah dikenal pasti. Mungkin dissertasi ini tidak menyeluruh, tetapi ia 
diharapkan dapat memberi sedikit idea dan paduan kepada pihak-pihak yang terlibat 
dalam industri pembinaan apabila mereka ingin menentukan sama ada sesuatu kontrak 
pembinaan batal atau boleh batal.
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Chapter 1 
Introduction
CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION
1.1 Background Studies 
The contract is normally a massive and complex document. 1  The word 
‘contract’ in a legal sense refers to an agreement between two or more parties that is 
legally binding between them: in the words of section 2(h) of the Contracts Act 1950 
(Act 136) (hereinafter called the Contracts Act), it is an agreement enforceable by 
law’. The nucleus of all contracts is an agreement, that is to say, all contracts must be 
built upon an agreement although not all agreements are automatically contracts. 
Some agreements are not contracts (i.e. the contracts are void) because they lack 
certain essential elements, e.g. certainty, free consent, etc.2
Like other ordinary contracts, construction contracts are created when two 
parties, either between employers and contractors, contractors and suppliers, or other 
1 Simon, M.S., “Construction Contracts And Claims.” (London: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1979), 
pp. 61 
2 Vohrah, B. & Wu, Min Aun, “The Commercial Law of Malaysia.” (Malaysia: Longman, 2004), pp. 
6.
2combinations, mutually agree to a transaction. This mutual agreement must apply to 
all significant, or “material”, aspects of the arrangement. For instance, if an employer
and a contractor agree that the contractor will perform certain construction work and 
be paid by the employer, but they fail to establish a price, a contract has not yet been 
created. But once the basic ingredients of the transaction have been agreed upon, a 
“contract” exists.3
When two parties create a contract that is to be completely binding, they must
have agreed freely, such that a condition known as consensus ad idem 4 , exist 
between them. An agreement may outwardly appear to satisfy all the requirements of 
a valid contract, but on closer examination the minds of the contracting parties are 
poles apart in respect of the terms of the contract. Such lack of genuineness can be
due to mistake, misrepresentation, duress or undue influence.5
The lack of genuineness may lead a construction contract to become void or 
voidable. The commonest categories of void contracts are contracts affected by 
mistake and illegality, and the majority of voidable contracts arise as a consequence 
of misrepresentation. Meanwhile, illegality as well may affect a contract in being as 
well as its formation.6 In accordance with Ashworth (1986), a void contract creates 
no legal rights and cannot therefore be sued upon; while a contract is said to be 
voidable when only one of the parties may take advantage.7
3 Jervis B. M. & Levin P., “Construction Law Principles And Practice.” (New York: McGraw-Hill,
1988), pp. 1. 
4 A maxim that means the agreement by contracting parties to identical terms that is necessary for the
formation of a legally binding contract. [As per Martin E. A., “Oxford Dictionary of Law.” 5th
Edition. (UK: Oxford University Press, 2003), pp. 105].
5 Seel, C., “Contractual Procedures For Building Students.” (London: Holt, Rinehart & Winston,
1984), pp. 19. 
6 Wallce, D., “Hudson’s Building and Engineering Contract.” 10th Edition. (London: Sweet & 
Maxwell, 1970), pp. 25. 
7 Ashworth, A. “Contractual Procedures In The Construction Industry.” (London: Longman, 1986),
pp. 13. 
31.2 Problem Statement
Notwithstanding the fact that an agreement may have been reached which
satisfies the legal requirements as to the form and manner of its conclusion, in certain 
circumstances such an agreement will be unenforceable as a contract because it is 
either void or voidable.8
As defined by Seel (1984), void contract is a type of contract which, even 
though it is not prohibited by law, is devoid of legal effect. No contract exists at all 
due to a lack of essential requirements. It cannot be enforced and no person can take
any rights under it.9 Meanwhile, if a contract is voidable, there is a contract valid 
until such time as one of the parties takes steps to have it set aside. However, the
right to have it set aside may be lost by delay, or by conduct affirming the contract, 
or by some innocent stranger to the contract acquiring rights or title to property under 
it.10
Thus, in construction industry, for instance, where there is a contract for the 
sale of materials between a contractor and a supplier, which is void, no title to the
materials passes from the supplier to the contractor and accordingly the contractor 
cannot, in general, pass any title in the materials to a third party, say an employer,
from whom they can be recovered. If, however, such a contract is only voidable, then 
title to the materials does pass and only reverts when the contract is avoided. If, 
before steps are taken to avoid the contract, the contractor resells the materials, he 
passes a good title to a purchaser without notice of the defect of title, and it is then 
too late to avoid the original contract.11
8 Wallce, D., “Hudson’s Building and Engineering Contract.” 10th Edition. (London: Sweet & 
Maxwell, 1970), pp. 24. 
9 Seel, C., “Contractual Procedures For Building Students.” (London: Holt, Rinehart & Winston,
1984), pp. 212. 
10 Wallce, D., “Hudson’s Building and Engineering Contract.” 10th Edition. (London: Sweet &
Maxwell, 1970), pp. 24. 
11 Ibid.
4According to Sweet (2000), it is difficult to determine the validity and 
voidability of a contract in the construction industry. There are circumstances which
can cause a construction contract to become void or voidable, and those 
circumstances may not be easy to be determined. For example, as raised by Seel 
(1984), an employer perhaps may face a situation where in a project for foundation 
work, in the mistaken belief that the subsoil of the site had insufficient bearing
capacity for the building he desires to erect, he signs a contract for piles to be driven. 
After the work has begun, can he avoid the contract for mistake when he discovers 
his error? Will the employer’s position be changed if he discovers his error before
the work has begun? Is this contract void, voidable or valid?
In view of the above, it is necessary for the parties to the contracts in this 
industry, especially the employers and the contractors, to have a complete
understanding to the concept of void and voidable contracts in order for them to
know clearly what circumstances may render a construction contract void or 
voidable.
1.3 Objective of Research 
From the problem statement above, the following is the objective of the study: - 
1. To identify the circumstances which cause a construction contract to become
void or voidable.
51.4 Scope of Research 
The following are the scope for this study: - 
1. Only construction cases will be discussed in the study. 
2. The study only examines the contracts between employers and contractors, 
contractors and sub-contractors, and contractors and suppliers.
1.5 Importance of Research 
The importance of this study is to give an approach of the circumstances that 
lead construction contracts to become void or voidable. Through this study, the
parties to the contracts in construction industry may able to have a more complete
understanding to the concept and their legal positions in a void or voidable contract. 
1.6 Research Process And Methods Of Approach 
This research was carried out through the following process and method (see 
Figure 1.1): - 
61.6.1 Initial Study
Firstly, during the initial study stage, initial literature review was done in 
order to obtain the overview of the concept of this topic. At the same time,
discussions with supervisors, lecturers, as well as course mates, were held so that
more ideas and knowledge relating to the topic could be collected. Afterward, the 
objective and scope of the research was fixed. Also a research outline was prepared
based on the objective and scope. 
1.6.2 Data And Information Collection 
Collection of relevant data and information was started in this stage. The 
sources are mainly consisting of books, journals, Malayan Law Journal, seminar
papers, etc. All collected data and information were recorded systematically.
1.6.2.1 Primary Data 
Primary data collected was mainly from Malayan Law Journal, Building Law 
Report and other law journals. It was collected through the LexisNexis law database. 
All the cases relating to the research were then collected. Next, those cases were 
sorted according to different fields such as construction contract cases, cases relating
to land matters, etc. Important cases were used for analysis at the later stage. 
1.6.2.2 Secondary Data 
Sources of secondary data consist of books, act, articles and seminar papers. 
These sources are important to complete the literature review chapter.
7(a) Books 
Books relating to construction laws and contract laws were read to know in 
depth the theories relating to the research field. 
(b) Seminar Papers And Articles 
Seminar papers and articles were the sources to strengthen the theories found 
in books. 
(c) Act 
Act is an important source to support the analysis done. Act used is the 
Contracts Act. 
1.6.3 Analysis 
In this stage, all the collected data, information, ideas, opinions and 
comments were arranged, analysed and also interpreted. This stage has streamlined
the process of writing of the paper. 
1.6.4 Completion 
The last stage of the research process mainly involved the writing up and 
checking of the writing. Conclusion and recommendations were made based on the 
findings during the stage of analysis.
8Fix the research objective, scope and prepare the research outline 
Approach: Documentary 
analysis
??Malayan law Journal 
??Books
Data analysis & interpretation
Data arrangement 
Writing & Checking 
Identify type of data needed and identify the data 
Data & information recording 
Initial literature review & Discussions 
Figure 1.1: Research Process and Methods of Approach
Chapter 2 
Voidable Contracts 
CHAPTER 2 
VOIDABLE CONTRACTS 
2.1 Background 
All agreements are contracts if they are made by the free consent of parties 
competent to contract, for a lawful consideration and with a lawful object, and are 
not hereby expressly declared to be void, as provided in section 10(1) of the 
Contracts Act. Parties competent to contract are those of the age of majority 
according to the law1 and of sound mind2. The law recognises a number of situations 
where, although a contract has been formed by parties who are competent to the 
contract, one or both parties are unable to enforce the agreement. One of the 
situations are when there is no free consent of the parties when enter into a contract.3
Free consent is the basis of a contractual relationship. There must be a 
meeting of the minds as to the nature and scope of the contract, a consensus ad
1 Per section 11 of the Contracts Act. 
2 Per section 11 and 12 of the Contracts Act. 
3 Uff, J. “Construction Law.” 5th Edition. (London: Sweet & Maxwell, 1991), pp. 95. 
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idem.4 But what constitutes consent? Two or more persons are said to consent when
they agree upon the same thing in the same sense.5 Consent must be free and not 
secured through such means as fraud, coercion, undue influence or
misrepresentation. As provided in section 14 of the Contracts Act: - 
Consent is said to be free when it is not caused by –
(a) coercion 
(b) undue influence
(c) fraud 
(d) misrepresentation 
(e) mistake
Consent is said to be so caused when it would not have been given but for the 
existence of such coercion, undue influence, fraud, misrepresentation or mistake. 
It is evidence that any of the factors listed above, if proven, impair the
validity of an agreement because consent to it is not free. The agreement is either 
void as in the case of operative mistake, which will be discussed in Chapter 3, or
voidable as in all the others. 
2.2 Voidable Contracts
An agreement may contain all the essential elements of a contract (such as 
proposal and acceptance, consideration, intention to create legal relations, legal 
capacity, etc.); nonetheless it may not be legally binding for a variety of reasons. The 
4 Vohrah, B. & Wu, Min Aun, “The Commercial Law of Malaysia.” (Malaysia: Longman, 2004), pp.
87.
5 Contracts Act, section 13. 
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court or the legislative may have deprived the agreement of its legal effects by 
declaring it to be void or voidable.6
Section 2(i) of the Contracts Act declares that: - 
An agreement, which is enforceable by law, at the option of one or more of the 
parties thereto, but not at the option of the other or others, is a voidable contract.
Therefore the term ‘voidable’ enacted in this subsection and applied to 
contract refers to an agreement, which the innocent parties can choose whether or not 
to let the contract stand.7 The agreement is valid and binding until the party entitled
to avoid it opts to do so. Consequently rights and duties may arise under a voidable
contract and third parties, acting in good faith and without knowledge of any 
vitiating circumstances, can acquire rights stemming from a voidable contract 
provided the contract has not been earlier avoided.8
For an example, supposing that a contractor obtains materials from a supplier 
under fraudulent circumstances which entitles the supplier to avoid the contract. If 
the contractor resells the materials to an employer, who is an innocent purchaser 
acting in good faith, the employer will then acquire a good title as against the 
supplier unless the supplier has earlier exercised his option to avoid the original
contract between him and the contractor before the resale to the employer.
Section 19(1) of the Contracts Act declares the voidability of agreements
without free consent in the following manner: - 
6 Vohrah, B. & Wu, Min Aun, “The Commercial Law of Malaysia.” (Malaysia: Longman, 2004), pp.
88.
7 Elliott, C. & Quinn, F., “Contract Law.” 4th Edition. (London: Longman, 2003), pp. 143. 
8 Vohrah, B. & Wu, Min Aun, “The Commercial Law of Malaysia.” (Malaysia: Longman, 2004), pp.
88.
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When consent to an agreement is caused by coercion, fraud or misrepresentation, 
the agreement is a contract voidable at the option of the party whose consent was
so caused. 
In addition, section 20 of the Contracts Act states that when ‘consent to an 
agreement is caused by undue influence, the agreement is a contract voidable at he 
option of the party whose consent was so caused.’ Thus under the Contracts Act, 
coercion, fraud, misrepresentation and undue influence will render an agreement
voidable at the option of the party whose consent was so caused. 
2.3 Fraud
Section 17 of the Contracts Act defines ‘fraud’ which includes various acts 
committed by a party to a contract with intent to deceive the contracting party. It
states: - 
‘Fraud’ includes any of the following acts committed to a party to a contract, or 
with his connivance, or by his agent, with intent to deceive another party thereto 
or his agent, or to induce him to enter into the contract: 
(a) the suggestion, as to fact, of that which is not true by one who does not 
believe it to be true; 
(b) the active concealment of a fact by one having knowledge of belief of the fact; 
(c) a promise made without any intention of performing it; 
(d) any other act fitted to deceive; and 
(e) any such act or omission as the law specially declares to be fraudulent. 
13
As a general rule, it may be stated that wherever a person causes another to
act on a false representation which the maker himself does not believe to be true, he 
is said to have committed a fraud.9 The state of a representor’s mind is an integral
part of fraud. The definition also embraces deceitful acts intended to induce the other 
party to enter into the contract, and therefore covers the common law definition of 
false representation as formulated by the House of Lords in the landmark case10,
Derry v. Peek11. In that classic decision, Lord Herschell employed the definition that:
-
“Fraud is proved when it is shown that false representation has been made 
(1) knowingly, or
(2) without belief in its truth, or 
(3) recklessly, careless whether it is true of false.”
One of the early local cases on fraud emanating from a superior court was 
that of Weber v. Brown12 where the plaintiff-respondent sued the defendant-appellant 
for damages in respect of an alleged false and fraudulent misrepresentation relating 
to the number of rubber trees on an estate over which the latter had the right of
purchase, which right he transferred for valuable consideration to the former. The 
number of trees represented was in excess of the number which actually existed on
the estate. The Court of Appeal agreed with the finding of the lower court that the
defendant-appellant had made the alleged misrepresentation falsely and fraudulently, 
and that it had caused the plaintiff-respondent to acquire and subsequently to 
exercise the right of purchase. 
It is further provided in the Explanation to section 19 that: - 
9 Lee, Mei Pheng, “General Principles of Malaysian Law.” (Malaysia: Penerbit Fajar Bakti Sdn. Bhd.,
2001), pp. 126. 
10 Vohrah, B. & Wu, Min Aun, “The Commercial Law of Malaysia.” (Malaysia: Longman, 2004), pp.
90.
11 [1889] 14 App Cas 337. 
12 [1908] 1 FMSLR 12. 
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A fraud or misrepresentation which did not cause the consent to a contract of the 
party on whom the fraud was practiced; or to whom the misrepresentation was 
made, does not render a contract voidable. 
The underlying principle behind the Explanation is clear and that is, the 
misrepresentation whether fraudulent or innocent is rendered irrelevant if it has not
induced or caused the other party to enter into the contract. The representee must
have relied on the statement of the representor.13 Consequently, a person entering 
into a contract with open eyes, knowing the falsity of a statement or has clearly not
relied on the statement, cannot latter seek to repudiate it on grounds of fraud or 
misrepresentation.14 This requirement is in line with the common law.15
In Kheng Chwee Lian v. Wong Tak Thong 16 , the respondent has been 
persuaded to enter into second contract on the false representation that the area of 
land to be transferred was of the same size as the land which the respondent had 
agreed to buy under a first agreement. The Federal Court agreed with the finding of 
the trial judge that the respondent was right in repudiating an agreement with the 
appellant on the ground that it was induced by fraudulent representation within the 
meaning of section 17(a) and (d) of the Contracts Act. Hence the respondent did not 
consent to the execution of the second agreement within the meaning if section 1317
and by virtue of the provision of section 19 of the Contracts Act the second 
agreement was voidable at the option of the respondent.
As noted earlier, section 17 listed five categories of actions which would 
constitute fraud. Further comments are necessary to clarify the law embodied in this 
13 In Mothoolal v. Life Insurance Corp. of India AIR 1962 SC 814, the Indian Supreme Court in
reference to the Explanation to section 19 of the Indian Contract Act stated that “a false
representation, whether fraudulent or innocent, is irrelevant if it has not induced the party to whom
it is made to act upon it by entering into the contract”.
14 Vohrah, B. & Wu, Min Aun, “The Commercial Law of Malaysia.” (Malaysia: Longman, 2004), pp.
91.
15 Horsfall v. Thomas [1862] 1 H & C 90; Sinnadurai, V., “Law of Contract in Malaysia and 
Singapore: Case & Commentaries.” 2nd Edition. (Singapore: Butterworths, 1987), pp. 214. 
16 [1983] 2 MLJ 320. 
17 Section 13 of the Contracts Act reads “Two or more persons are said to consent when they agree
upon the same thing in the same sense.”
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section. Paragraph (b) of section 17 mentions ‘the active concealment of a fact by
one having knowledge of belief of the fact’. An example of such a fraud is given in 
Illustration (c) to section 19 which states: - 
B, having discovered a vein of ore on the estate of A, adopts means to conceal, 
and does conceal, the existence of the ore from A. Through A’s ignorance B is 
enabled to buy the estate at an undervalue. The contract is voidable at the option 
of A. 
Section 17 paragraph (c) declares that fraud includes ‘a promise made 
without any intention of performing it’. When a promise is incorporated into the
contract as a term, an action for breach will lie against the promisor for failure to 
carry out the promise. A potential difficulty with this provision is likely to arise when
the promise is seen as a representation not of an existing fact but an intention to do 
something in the future18 notwithstanding the fact that the court has said that “the
state of a man’s mind is as much a fact as the state of his digestion … A
misrepresentation as to the state of a man’s mind is, therefore, a misstatement of 
fact”19.
In Weber v. Brown 20 cited earlier, the defendant-appellant attempted to 
invoke the Exception to section 19 of the Contracts Act as a defence. This Exception 
provides: - 
If such consent was caused by misrepresentation or by silence, fraudulent within 
the meaning of section 17, the contract, nevertheless, is not voidable, if the party 
whose consent was so caused had the means of discovering the truth with 
ordinary diligence. 
18 Vohrah, B. & Wu, Min Aun, “The Commercial Law of Malaysia.” (Malaysia: Longman, 2004), pp.
92.
19 Edgington v. Fitzmaurice [1884] 29 Ch D 459. 
20 [1908] 1 FMSLR 12. 
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The Court of Appeal, however, rejected this defence, ruling that ‘the
exception does not apply to cases where the misrepresentation is by a false and
fraudulent assertion’ such as it was established in that case. The Court also pointed 
out obiter, which section 19 on which the arguments of the defendant-appellant had 
been based, was a section declaring the voidability of certain contracts and most of 
the cases cited by counsel had been related to specific performance or rescission. In 
the instant case before their Lordships, the plaintiff-respondent had not sought to 
avoid the contract but claimed damages in respect of the fraudulent 
misrepresentation. In their Lordship’s view, the right to claim damages was not dealt 
with by the statute which ‘does not profess to do more than define and amend certain 
parts of the law relating to contracts.’ Thus the fact that the plaintiff-respondent
elected to stand by the contract despite the fraud was, in their Lordships’ view, no 
bar to their obtaining damages.21
It has been highlighted by Sinnadurai (1987) that this particular observation 
of court is erroneous. In his view, the statement by Belfield A.C.J. 22  shall be
followed: - 
“… in stating that the Contract Enactment is silent on the issue of recovery of
damages for fraud, had clearly overlooked the scope of section 19(2). This 
provision expressly provides for damages to be awarded in cases where a party 
affirms a contract induced by fraud or fraudulent misrepresentation.” 
2.3.1 Proof 
Where there is an allegation of fraud, the burden of proving fraud lies on the 
party making the claim and the standard of proof required is higher than is normally
21 Vohrah, B. & Wu, Min Aun, “The Commercial Law of Malaysia.” (Malaysia: Longman, 2004), pp.
93.
22 Sinnadurai, V., “Law of Contract in Malaysia and Singapore: Case & Commentaries.” 2nd Edition.
(Singapore: Butterworths, 1987), pp. 249. 
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required in civil case.23 In Lau Hee Teah v. Hargill Engineering Sdn. Bhd. & Anor24,
the plaintiff-appellant attempted to rescind an agreement to take a loader on hire-
purchase alleging fraudulent misrepresentation. The Federal Court, in dismissing the 
appeal, held that the appellant had failed to discharge the burden of proof required of 
him on the question of fraud. However, it appears that the Privy Council in Datuk
Jaginder Singh & Ors v. Tara Rajaratnam25, went even further by stating that ‘the
standard of proof of fraud in civil proceedings was the criminal standard of proof 
beyond reasonable doubt’.
2.3.2 Silence 
‘Mere silence as to facts likely to affect the willingness of a person to enter 
into a contract is not fraud’ declares the Explanation to section 17 which is a 
restatement of the common law. However, there are a number of well recognised
circumstances in which failure by one party to speak out may amount to fraud and 
this is also provided in the same Explanation which continues, ‘unless the 
circumstances of the case are such that, regard being had to them, it is the duty of 
the person keeping silence to speak, or unless his silence is, in itself, equivalent to
speech’. In certain circumstances, the nature of the contract or the relationship of the
parties is such that there is a positive duty on one party to disclose facts. In insurance
contracts, for instance, the nature of the contract is such that there is a legal duty on 
the insured to disclose material facts that is likely to influence a prudent insurer and a 
failure to do so may entitle the insurer to rescind the contract. This duty of disclosure
is dictated by the principle of utmost good faith (uberrimae fidei) applicable to 
contracts of insurance. In respect of the relationship between the contracting parties, 
where they are in a fiduciary relationship such as between a solicitor and client, the 
relationship requires the fiduciary to look after the interests of his beneficiary.26
23 Vohrah, B. & Wu, Min Aun, “The Commercial Law of Malaysia.” (Malaysia: Longman, 2004), pp.
93.
24 [1980] 1 MLJ 145. 
25 [1985] 1 MLJ 105. 
26 Vohrah, B. & Wu, Min Aun, “The Commercial Law of Malaysia.” (Malaysia: Longman, 2004), pp.
94
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2.4 Misrepresentation 
First of all, a representation is a statement made by one party to the other, 
before or at the time of the contract, with regard to some existing fact or to some
event, which is material to the contract. 27 Hence, the term ‘misrepresentation’
normally refers to certain false statement made by a representor and which includes
the other party to enter into a contract.28 As similar to English law, where one party 
(the representee) has been induced to enter into a contract as a result of a
misrepresentation by the other party (the representor), such a contract is said to be
voidable.29
However, the Contracts Act does not use the terms “fraudulent 
misrepresentation”, “negligent misrepresentation”, or “innocent misrepresentation”,
which are familiar under the English law.30 Basically, the English law relating to 
misrepresentation went through three stages, leaving it in a somewhat complex state. 
First, the common law gave relief by way of damages, or rescission if the 
misrepresentation was fraudulent or if it has been incorporated in the contract as a 
term. Negligent misrepresentation was a part of innocent misrepresentation until the 
House of Lords decision in Hedley Byrne & Co. Ltd v. Heller and Partners Ltd31
when the common law right to damages was extended to it. Secondly, where a 
misrepresentation was wholly innocent, equity gave relief by way of rescission but 
not damages and thirdly, the Misrepresentation Act 1967 in its first two sections 
extended the scope of rescission and damages for misrepresentation.32 The Act did 
not really resolve all the problems, and the first two sections, in the words of an 
English author: - 
27 Barker, D. & Padfield, C., “Law Made Simple.” 11th Edition. (Amsterdam: Made Simple Books,
2003), pp. 138. 
28 Vohrah, B. & Wu, Min Aun, “The Commercial Law of Malaysia.” (Malaysia: Longman, 2004), pp.
96.
29 Wallace, I. N. D., “Hudson’s Building & Engineering Contracts.” (London: Sweet & Maxwell,
1995), pp. 64. 
30 “Halsbury’s Laws of Malaysia: Contract.” Volume 23. (Malaysia: Malayan Law Journal, 2002), pp.
336.
31 [1964] AC 465. 
32 Treital, G. H., “An Outline of the Law of Contract.” (London: Butterworths, 1975), pp. 127. 
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“… give rise to many difficulties: in particular, the relationship between the new 
statutory remedies and those which continue to exist at common law and in 
equity is not made at all clear.”33
In respect of negligent misrepresentation, it is a statement which is made
carelessly, though not dishonestly.34 The cause of action is arising out of a breach of 
duty to take care, and such duty flows from a contract or from a special relationship 
between the parties.35 The House of Lords in Hedley Byrne case indicated, through 
obiter that one party could be liable for damages to another for careless though 
innocent misrepresentation arising out of a special relationship, even though there is 
no contract between the representor and representee.36 Such a relationship can arise, 
for instance, where a local council gives misleading information knowing that they 
would be relied upon and thereby causing financial loss to the recipient of such 
information.37
How do all these affect the local law on misrepresentation? As discussed in 
para 2.3, the common law principle of fraudulent misrepresentation falls under 
section 17 of the Contracts Act while section 18 deals only with misrepresentation in 
the three prescribed situations. It is not an exhaustive list, so that the common law 
continues to apply unless it is repugnant to the said provision which is reproduced 
below: - 
‘Misrepresentation’ includes - 
(a) the positive assertion, in a manner not warranted by the information of the
person making it, of that which is not true, though he believes it to be true; 
33 Treital, G. H., “An Outline of the Law of Contract.” (London: Butterworths, 1975), pp. 128. 
34 Barker, D. & Padfield, C., “Law Made Simple.” 11th Edition. (Amsterdam: Made Simple Books,
2003), pp. 141. 
35 Vohrah, B. & Wu, Min Aun, “The Commercial Law of Malaysia.” (Malaysia: Longman, 2004), pp.
96.
36 Wallace, I. N. D., “Hudson’s Building & Engineering Contracts.” (London: Sweet & Maxwell,
1995), pp. 64. 
37 L Shaddock & Associates Pty Ltd. v. Parramatta City Council [1981] 55 ALJR 713. The High Court
of Australia in this case held the City Council responsible for supplying incorrect information. The 
Court ruled that the Council owed a duty to take reasonable care in furnishing information.
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(b) any breach of duty which, without an intent to deceive, gives an advantage to
the person committing it, or anyone claiming under him, by misleading
another to his prejudice, or to the prejudice of anyone claiming under him; 
and
(c) causing, however innocently, a party to an agreement to make a mistake as to
the substance of the thing which is the subject of the agreement. 
There is a dearth of local cases on interpretation of this section.38
 Negligent misrepresentation arising out of a breach of duty is probably 
covered by paragraph (b). An honest belief in the truth of a statement made is no 
defence to misrepresentation under paragraph (a) where the statement is made in 
manner not warranted by the information available to the representor.39
Paragraph (c) would be better understood in the light of section 23 which
states that: - 
A contract is not voidable merely because it was caused by one of the parties to it 
being under a mistake as to a matter of fact. 
A contractor who purchases an excavator in the mistaken belief that it is of a
particular quality has no remedy in the absence of any vitiating factors. He has only 
himself to blame for the mistake. However, if the mistake had been induced by the 
other party, it is a voidable for misrepresentation, within the meaning of paragraph 
(c), at the option of the innocent party whose consent was so caused.
38 Vohrah, B. & Wu, Min Aun, “The Commercial Law of Malaysia.” (Malaysia: Longman, 2004), pp.
97.
39 Ibid.
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2.4.1 Duty of Disclosure 
There are two extreme principles. At one end is the principle of the right of a
contracting party to remain silent, even as to facts which may affect the decision of 
the other party. In other words, silence by a party does not in general amount to 
misrepresentation.40 The principle is enacted in the first part of the Explanation in
section 17 of the Contracts Act which states “mere silence as to facts likely to affect
the willingness of a person to enter into a contract is not fraud …” Illustration (a)
and (d) in section 17 provide examples of this: - 
(a) A sells, by auction, to B, a horse which A knows to be unsound. A says 
nothing to B about the horse’s unsoundness. This is not fraud in A. 
(d) A and B, being traders, enter upon a contract. A has private information of a 
change in prices which would affect B’s willingness to proceed with the 
contract. A is not bound to inform B. 
At the other end of the extreme, certain circumstances require a party to 
disclose information to each other; otherwise the contract is voidable at the option of 
the innocent party. This principle is found in the second limb of the Explanation in 
section 17 which reads “…unless the circumstances of the case are such that, regard 
being had to them, it is the duty of the person keeping silence to speak, or unless his 
silence is, in itself, equivalent to speech’. Illustration (b) and (c) provides examples
of this rule: - 
(b) B is A’s daughter and had just come of age. Here, the relation between the 
parties would make it A’s duty to tell B if the horse is sound. 
(c) B says to A, ‘If you do not deny it, I shall assume that the horse is sound.’ A
says nothing. Here, A’s silence is equivalent to speech. 
40 Barker, D. & Padfield, C., “Law Made Simple.” 11th Edition. (Amsterdam: Made Simple Books,
2003), pp. 143. 
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These examples represent the extremes and do not lay down the general rule. 
It would appear that taken together, the statutory Explanation and judicial decisions 
provide that as a general rule, ‘mere silence’ does not amount to misrepresentation
unless ‘circumstances of the case are such that … it is duty of the person keeping
silence to speak’. 41 Section 18(b) of the Contracts Act adds to it by stating in
particular that misrepresentation occurs if there is ‘any breach of duty’. 
In common law, the several circumstances to which exceptions to the silence 
rule have been applied include those classes of contracts considered of the ‘utmost
good faith’, referred to as uberrimae fidei. The principal contract in this case are 
insurance contracts requiring full and frank disclosure of all material information
likely to affect the risk. Failure to disclose material information allows the other
party, in most cases the insurer, availing him of the right, to avoid the contract.42 The 
rationale for this rule in insurance contracts is provided in the judgment of Kennedy 
L.J. in London General Omnibus Co. Ltd v. Holloway43 when his Lordship said: - 
“The person seeking to insure may fairly be presumed to know all the
circumstances which materially affect the risk, and generally is, as to some of
them, the only person who has the knowledge. The underwriter … cannot as a 
rule know and but rarely has either the time or the opportunity to learn by 
inquiry, circumstances which are or may be most material to the information of 
the judgment as to the acceptance or rejection of the risk and as to the premium
which he ought to require.”
 In Goh Chooi Leong v. Public Life Assurance Co. Ltd44, the High Court ruled 
that there was a deliberate non-disclosure when in a life insurance contract; the
assured had failed to disclosure that he had previously suffered from Tuberculosis. 
41 Lee, Mei Pheng, “General Principles of Malaysian Law.” (Malaysia: Penerbit Fajar Bakti Sdn.
Bhd., 2001), pp. 128. 
42 Vohrah, B. & Wu, Min Aun, “The Commercial Law of Malaysia.” (Malaysia: Longman, 2004), pp.
98.
43 [1911 – 1913] All ER Rep. 518. 
44 [1964] MLJ 16. 
23
As declared by Gill J., “It is trite law that a contract of insurance is a contract 
uberrimae fidei which can be avoided for non-disclosure of material facts.”
2.4.2 Exception to section 19 
The Exception to section 19 of the Contracts Act declares: - 
If such consent was caused by misrepresentation or by silence, fraudulent within 
the meaning of section 17, the contract, nevertheless, is not voidable, if the party 
whose consent was so caused had the means of discovering the truth with 
ordinary diligence. 
Illustration (b) in section 19 provides an example of the application of this 
Exception: - 
A, by a misrepresentation, leads B erroneously to believe that five hundred 
gantangs of indigo are made annually at A’s factory. B examines the accounts of 
the factory, which show that only four hundred gantangs of indigo have been 
made. After this B buys the factory. The contracts is not voidable on account of 
A’s misrepresentation. 
The Exception and Illustration (b) taken together suggest that a party whose 
consent is caused by misrepresentation or by silence amounting to fraud cannot avoid 
the contract if he has the means of discovering the truth with ordinary diligence. This
appears to be a departure from English common law where it is not a defence that the 
representee was negligent or foolish or had the opportunity to verify the statement.45
45 Boscaini Investment Pty Ltd v. Petrides [1982] 103 LSJS 250; Aaron’s Reefs Ltd v. Twiss [1986]
AC 273; Vohrah, B. & Wu, Min Aun, “The Commercial Law of Malaysia.” (Malaysia: Longman,
2004), pp. 100. 
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This section 19 defence has not been specifically invoked in the current pool 
of local authorities.46 The only local reference to this Exception is in Weber v. 
Brown47 where the court rejected the defendant’s attempt to rely on the defence on
the ground that it could not be used by the defendant who had been guilty of a false 
and fraudulent misrepresentation.
2.5 Coercion 
Since a contract will only be binding if the parties voluntarily consent to it, it 
is obvious that where one party is forced to consent by threats or undue persuasion 
by the other, that consent should be invalid.48 One form of such threats is ‘coercion’
and has been defined in section 15 of the Contracts Act for the purposes of section 14 
(as discussed in para 2.1) which, among others, require ‘free consent’ of contracting 
parties. The latter section goes on to provide that consent is free when it is not caused
by ‘coercion’ as defined by section 15, or others such as ‘undue influence, fraud, 
misrepresentation and mistake’. The relevant part of section 15 reads as follows: - 
‘Coercion’ is the committing, or threatening to commit any act forbidden by the 
Penal Code, or the unlawful detaining or threatening to detain, any property, to 
the prejudice of any person whatever, with the intention of causing any person to 
enter into an agreement. 
Lord Moulton in Kanhaya Lal v. National Bank of India Ltd49, an appeal to 
the Privy Council from India on a provision in pari materia with the local Act,
opined that the definition of ‘coercion’ was solely a definition which applied ‘to the 
46 Vohrah, B. & Wu, Min Aun, “The Commercial Law of Malaysia.” (Malaysia: Longman, 2004), pp.
100.
47 [1908] 1 FMSLR 12. 
48 Elliott, C. & Quinn, F., “Contract Law.” 4th Edition. (London: Longman, 2003), pp. 197. 
49 [1913] 40 Cal 598. 
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consideration whether there has been ‘free consent’ to an agreement so as to render it 
a contract’. This means that the definition of ‘coercion’ under section 15 applies 
solely to the consideration whether there has been free consent to an agreement so as 
to render it a contract under section 10 of the Contracts Act.50
The definition of ‘coercion’ seems covers duress at common law which has 
traditionally meant actual violence or threats of violence to the person of the
contracting party or someone close to that person.51 The common law of duress 
relating to the unlawful threat to detain goods is a little unclear although it has been
held that money paid to release goods unlawfully detained is recoverable.52 In any
case, its importance is greatly diminished light of the wide definition of coercion 
under the Contracts Act which includes ‘the unlawful detaining or threatening to 
detain any property, to the prejudice of any person whatever’53.
In Kanhaya Lal case, the Privy Council ruled that the plaintiff was entitled to 
recover money paid as a consequence of coercion caused by the wrongful
interference of the defendant bank with property. It followed the precedent
established by an earlier case, Dulichand v. Ram Kishen Singh54, in circumstances
which were almost similar and wherein the Privy Council held that money paid by 
the true owner to prevent the sale of his property under an execution could be 
recovered. In the latter case, their Lordships went on to say obiter that: - 
“If the goods of a third person are seized by the sheriff and are about to be sold 
as the goods of the defendant, and the true owner pays money to protect his 
goods and prevent the sale, he may bring an action to recover back the money he 
has so paid; it is the compulsion under which they are about to be sold that 
makes the payment involuntary.”
50 Lee, Mei Pheng, “General Principles of Malaysian Law.” (Malaysia: Penerbit Fajar Bakti Sdn.
Bhd., 2001), pp. 121. 
51 Barton v. Armstrong [1976] AC 104; Kaufman v. Gerson [1904] 1 KB 591.
52 Maskell v. Horner [1915] 3 KB 106. 
53 Section 15 of the Contracts Act.
54 [1881] ILR 7 Cal 648. 
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The first limb of the statutory definition of ‘coercion’ limits the ‘committing,
or threatening to commit any act forbidden under the Penal Code’. The Penal Code 
is the criminal law of the country and it would appear that tortious wrong or threats
thereof are excluded. 55 The Explanation to section 15 further explains that in 
determining coercion it is ‘immaterial whether the Penal Code is or is not in force in 
the place where the coercion is employed’. This is followed by the Illustration which 
reads: -
A, on board an English ship on the high seas, causes B to enter into an 
agreement by an act amounting to criminal intimidation under the Penal Code. 
A afterwards sues B for breach of contract at Taiping. 
A has employed coercion, although his act is not an offence by the law of 
England, and although section 506 of the Penal Code was not in force at the time 
when or place where the act was done. 
The criminal law is also found in statutes other than the Penal Code, and it is 
conceivable that considerable difficulties may arise on the question of coercion 
involving offences outside the Penal Code since the definition makes no mention of 
other statutes. An appropriate amendment would clear any doubt and extend the 
scope of section 15.56
However, in light of the fact that the Contracts Act is not an exhaustive code, 
the common law will in all probability continue to apply.57 ‘Duress’ was applied in 
Kesarmal s/o Letchman Das v. Valiappa Chettiar58 where the court held invalid a
transfer executed under the orders of the Sultan, issued in the ominous presence of 
two Japanese officers during the Japanese Occupation of Malaysia. In the instant 
55 Vohrah, B. & Wu, Min Aun, “The Commercial Law of Malaysia.” (Malaysia: Longman, 2004), pp.
103.
56 Ibid, pp. 104. 
57 Ibid.
58 [1954] MLJ 119. 
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case, consent was not free and, therefore, the transfer became voidable at the will of 
the party whose consent was so caused. Similar judgement was also held in Chung
Peng Chee v. Cho Yew Fai & Ors59.
 In Chin Nam Bee Development Sdn. Bhd. v. Tai Kim Choo & 4 Ors60, the 
respondents purchased homes off the plan to be constructed by the appellants. Each 
of the respondents had signed a sale and purchase agreement to purchase a house at 
$29,500. Subsequently, the respondent was made to pay an additional $4,000. The 
court was asked to determine if the additional payment was made voluntarily or 
under threat by the appellants to cancel the respondents’ booking for their houses.
The lower court had found that payment was not voluntary but had been made under
threat. The appeal was dismissed by the High Court which ruled that there was 
coercion as defined in section 15 of the Contracts Act. It further added that the
definition in section 15 should only apply for the purpose contained in section 1461,
and not for the entire Act. Given this interpretation, the word ‘coercion’ in section 
7362 is not restricted to the meaning in section 15, and should be given its ordinary 
and general meaning.63
2.5.1 Economic Duress
Recently there has developed in England and other common law countries a
new category of duress called economic duress.64 The House of Lords in Universe
59 [1954] MLJ 100. 
60 [1988] 2 MLJ 117. 
61 See para 2.1. 
62 Section 73 of the Contracts Act reads “A person to whom money has been paid, or anything
delivered, by mistake or under coercion, must repay or return it.”
63 Naested v. State of Perak [1923] 5 FMSLR 185. The Court of Appeal in this case dealt with an
equivalent section to section 73 of the Contracts Act. Woodward C. J. held that money paid, not
voluntarily, but to prevent the threatened consequences of non-payment, was recoverable as a
payment made without consideration, and under coercion, within the meaning of section 73. 
64 Mocatta J. in North Ocean Shipping Co. Ltd v. Hyundai Construction Co. Ltd [1978] 3 All ER 1170
held that money paid was recoverable because of economic duress but the right was lost due to
affirmation caused by delay. In the application of the concept of economic duress, his Lordship
relied on an Australian precedent, T A Sundell & Sons Pty Ltd v. Emm Yannoulatos (Overseas) Ltd
[1956] 56 SR (NSW) 323. 
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Tankships of Monrovia v. International Transport Workers Federation65 considered
the issue of a black banning of a ship, among others, to induce the owners to make a
contribution to a welfare fund. A majority of the House of Lords held that the action 
was illegitimate, so that payment could be recovered thereby endorsing the principle 
of economic duress. 
The Privy Council in Pao On v. Lau Yiu Long66 had earlier recognised the 
same principle although in that particular case, it held that a contract renegotiated 
under pressure of a threat to withdraw was no more than ordinary commercial 
pressure. Lord Scarman who later deliberated in the Universe Tankships of Monrovia
case, in delivering the judgment of the Privy Council, said in reference to two earlier 
English cases67: - 
“Recently two English judges have recognised that commercial pressure may 
constitute duress the pressure of which can render a contract voidable: Kerr J. in 
Occidental Worldwise Corporation v. Skibs A/S Avanti68 and Mocatta J. in North 
Ocean Shipping Co. Ltd v. Hyundai Construction Co. Ltd69. Both stressed that 
the pressure must be such that the victim’s consent to the contract was not a 
voluntary act on his part. In their Lordships’ view, there is nothing contrary to 
principle in recognising economic duress as a factor which may render a 
contract voidable, provided always that the basis of such recognition is that it 
must amount to a coercion of will, which vitiates consent. It must be shown that
payment made or the contract entered into was not a voluntary act.” 
In would appear from the above cases that duress in all its forms consists of 
two elements. First, the exertion of pressure amounting to compulsion of the will of
65 [1983] 1 AC 399. 
66 [1980] AC 614. 
67 Vohrah, B. & Wu, Min Aun, “The Commercial Law of Malaysia.” (Malaysia: Longman, 2004), pp.
105.
68 [1976] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 293. 
69 [1978] 3 All ER 1170. 
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the victim and second, the illegitimacy of the pressure exerted.70 ‘Compulsion means 
effected lack of choice which may be evidenced by protest, by lack of independent 
advice or by resort to legal process, though none of these is essential to prove 
compulsion.’71 Legitimacy is viewed with reference to the lawfulness of the pressure,
so that if the latter is unlawful, the pressure is illegitimate.72
2.6 Undue Influence
Undue influence may arise where the parties stand to one another, in a 
relation of confidence which puts one of them in a position, to exercise over the other
an influence, which may be perfectly natural and proper in it, but is capable of being 
unfairly used. 73 In a simpler way, a plaintiff may be pressured to enter into a 
transaction by the influence of the other who was able to exercise over him. The 
plaintiff may rescind the transaction on the grounds known as ‘undue influence’74
and in the words of section 16(1) of the Contracts Act, it occurs: -
… where the relations subsisting between the parties are such that one of the
parties is in a position to dominate the will of the other and uses that position to 
obtain an unfair advantage over the other. 
70 Vohrah, B. & Wu, Min Aun, “The Commercial Law of Malaysia.” (Malaysia: Longman, 2004), pp.
106.
71 Starke J. G.,  “Cheshire & Fifoot’s Law of Contract.” 5th Edition. (Sydney: Butterworths, 1988), pp.
319.
72 Vohrah, B. & Wu, Min Aun, “The Commercial Law of Malaysia.” (Malaysia: Longman, 2004), pp.
106.
73 Guest, A.G., “Anson’s Law of Contract.” 24th Edition. (London: Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1975),
pp. 262. 
74 Vohrah, B. & Wu, Min Aun, “The Commercial Law of Malaysia.” (Malaysia: Longman, 2004), pp.
106.
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The two essential ingredients are (1) the domination of the will by one party
over the other (or special relationship between the parties75) and (2) obtaining an 
unfair advantage. In English law, equity will grant relief to the party who is
pressured, and the underlying basis for this doctrine is to prevent the party from 
taking unconscientious advantage of a position of dominance.76 Lord Lindley L.J. in 
the classic case, Allcard v. Skinner77 observed that the doctrine: - 
“to protect people from being forced, tricked or misled in any way by others into
parting with their property is one of the most legitimate objects of laws; and the 
equitable doctrine of undue influence has grown out of and been developed by 
the necessity of grappling with insidious forms of spiritual tyranny and with the 
infinite varieties of fraud.” 
The law as enacted in section 16 is much the same as in English law78, and applies to 
cases involving both contracts and gifts. 
Lord Shaw in the leading Indian case of Poosathurai v. Kannappa Chettiar & 
Ors79, explained that ‘influence’ alone is insufficient to support an action to set aside 
a transaction. ‘It is a mistake to treat undue influence as having been established by a 
proof of the relations of the parties having been such that the one naturally relied 
upon the other for advice, and the other was in a position to dominate the will of the 
first in giving it’. It is also necessary to establish that such influence is ‘undue’, that 
is, the person in a position of domination has used that position to obtain an unfair 
advantage for himself and thereby causing injury to the person relying upon his 
authority. Finally, when the bargain has been established as being unconscionable the 
burden then falls on the dominant party to prove affirmatively that no domination
75 Guest, A.G., “Anson’s Law of Contract.” 24th Edition. (London: Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1975),
pp. 263. 
76 Vohrah, B. & Wu, Min Aun, “The Commercial Law of Malaysia.” (Malaysia: Longman, 2004), pp.
106.
77 [1887] Ch D 145. 
78 National Westminster Bank Plc v. Morgan [1985] 1 All ER 821; Lloyds Bank Ltd v. Bundy [1975]
QB 326. 
79 [1919] 47 IA 1. 
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was practised to bring about the transaction.80 These three principles are incorporated 
in subsection (3) (a) of section 16 of the Contracts Act: - 
Where a person who is in a position to dominate the will of another, enters into a
contract with him, and the transaction appears, on the face of it or on the 
evidence adduced, to be unconscionable, the burden of proving that the contract
was not induced by undue influence shall lie upon the person in a position to 
dominate the will of the other. 
Illustration (c) to section 16 provides an example of the application of the 
above rule: - 
A, being in dept to B, the moneylender of his village, contracts a fresh loan on 
terms which appear to be unconscionable. It lies on B to prove that the contract 
was not induced by undue influence. 
In certain circumstances, a party is deemed to be in a position to dominate the 
will of another. Section 16(2) provides three such circumstances: - 
(a) Where one party ‘holds a real or apparent authority over the other’. For 
example, a parent’s authority over a child, as stated in Illustration (a), which 
reads: - 
A having advanced money to his son, B, during his minority, upon B’s coming 
of age, obtains, by misuse of parental influence, a bond from B for a greater 
amount than the sum due in respect of the advance. A employs undue 
influence.
(b) Where one party ‘stands in a fiduciary relation to the other’, as in the case of
the confidential relationship between a solicitor and client, trustee and 
80 Vohrah, B. & Wu, Min Aun, “The Commercial Law of Malaysia.” (Malaysia: Longman, 2004), pp.
107.
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beneficiary, religious adviser and follower and many others81. An example is 
also proved in Illustration (b), which reads: - 
A, a man enfeebled by disease or age, is induced, by B’s influence over him 
as his medical attendant, to agree to pay B an unreasonable sum for his 
professional services. B employs undue influence. 
(c) Where a party ‘makes a contract with a person whose mental capacity is
temporarily or permanently affected by reason of age, illness, or mental or
bodily distress’. Illustration (b) cited above is also applicable as an example
of such a situation. 
In those circumstances outlined, there is a rebuttable presumption of undue 
influence. The equitable view is based on the fact that the confidence reposed in one 
party either endows him with exceptional authority over the other or imposes on him
the duty to give disinterested advice. It is more than likely that the confidant may put 
his own interest above that of the party being dominated that a duty is required of the 
former to prove that he has not abused his position. Hence the burden is on him to 
prove otherwise.82
In a recent House of Lords decision, National Westminster Bank Plc v.
Morgan83, Lord Scarman with whom the other Law Lords agreed indicated the need
to show manifest disadvantage of a contract to the party being dominated. It does 
appear that it may no longer be sufficient in a contract situation, as opposed to a gift, 
to merely show the relationship of confidence. Whether the view, that it is necessary
to prove that advantage had been taken by the ascendant party of the relationship to 
81 Vohrah, B. & Wu, Min Aun, “The Commercial Law of Malaysia.” (Malaysia: Longman, 2004), pp.
108.
82 Starke J. G., et al, “Cheshire & Fifoot’s Law of Contract.” 5th Edition. (Sydney: Butterworths,
1988), pp. 324. 
83 [1985] 1 All ER 821. 
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the detriment of the party seeking to set aside the contract, will be adopted in
Malaysian courts has yet to be determined.84
All the authorities cited in the preceding paragraphs were in fact examined by
the High Court in Saw Gaik Beow v. Cheong Yew Weng & Ors85 where it was 
alleged, among others, that there was undue influence in a contract of sale in respect
of a property. The court accepted the views expressed in those authorities, namely,
the party alleging undue influence must show that: - 
(a) The other party had the capacity to influence him;
(b) The influence was exercised; 
(c) Its exercise was undue; and 
(d) Its exercise brought about the transaction. 
It found that none of these conditions was satisfied in the instant case. 
There are a number of other local cases dealing with undue influence. In 
Salwath Haneem v. Hadjee Abdullah 86 , the plaintiff’s husband executed a 
conveyance of property belonging to himself and the plaintiff to B and C, his
brothers. The plaintiff agreed to the conveyance but after her husband death, she 
brought an action seeking to set aside the agreement and the conveyance. The Straits 
Settlements Court of Appeal held that a confidential relationship existed between the 
plaintiff and B and C. The burden of proof thereby lay on B and C to show that the 
plaintiff fully understood the transaction and executed the conveyance freely and 
without being subject to undue influence. Since both B and C failed to discharge the 
burden, the transaction was set aside. 
84 Vohrah, B. & Wu, Min Aun, “The Commercial Law of Malaysia.” (Malaysia: Longman, 2004), pp.
108.
85 [1989] 3 MLJ 301. 
86 [1894] 2 SSLR 57. 
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 In Chait Sing v. Budin bin Abdullah87, a presumption of undue influence on 
the grounds of unconscionable bargain was also upheld when a moneylender sued a 
borrower on a loan at 36% interest, an excessive rate, and in the light of the fact that 
the defendant was an illiterate. In Datuk Jaginder Singh and Ors v. Tara 
Rajaratnam88, the respondent who was the registered proprietor of land, claimed that 
she was induced by the fraud and undue influence of the first and second appellant to 
transfer her land to the second appellant. The Federal Court, confirming the findings 
of the High Court, held that the appellants and respondent were in a solicitor-client
relationship, the transaction was unconscionable, and in therefore, the burden was on 
the appellants to rebut the presumption of undue influence. Since they had not 
discharged that burden, the transaction was set aside. In addition to undue influence, 
the trial court also found that the appellants’ conduct had been fraudulent and 
exercised its discretion in awarding damages which was upheld by the appellate 
court.
87 [1918] 1 FMSLR 348. 
88 [1983] 2 MLJ 196. 
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CHAPTER 3 
VOID CONTRACTS 
3.1 Background 
Under the Contract Act, no distinction is drawn between illegal or void 
contracts as understood in the English Law.1 In Malaysia, a contract may be void 
through illegality or other reasons such as the lack of consideration or operative 
mistake. Contracts void through illegality are treated more strictly by the law, and the 
general rule is that the court will refuse its aid to a person who founds his or her 
cause of action upon an immoral or illegal act2; the policy is encapsulated in the 
maxim ex dolo malo non oritur actio3.
The Contracts Act does not seem to distinguish between the classes of 
contracts that are merely void without the character of illegality from those contracts 
1 Visu Sinadurai, “Law of Contract in Malaysia and Singapore.” 2nd Edition. (Singapore: Butterworth, 
1987), pp. 357. 
2 Vohrah, B. & Wu, Min Aun, “The Commercial Law of Malaysia.” (Malaysia: Longman, 2004), pp. 
120.
3 Translated by Lord Mansfield in Hopman v. Johnson [1775-1802] All ER Rep 98 as ‘No court will 
lend its aid to a man who founds his cause of action upon an immoral or an illegal act’.
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which are void through illegality as understood in English law.4 Section 2(g) of the 
Contracts Act merely provides that ‘an agreement not enforceable by law is said to 
be void’. Other relevant provisions are section 10(1) which states that a contract must
be made the free consent of competent parties, ‘for a lawful consideration and with a 
lawful object’; sections 21 to 23 which concern an agreement where the both parties
are under ‘a mistake as to subject matter’ is void; and section 24 which provides: - 
The consideration or object of an agreement is lawful unless –
(a) it is forbidden by a law; 
(b) it is of such a nature that, if permitted, it would defeat any law; 
(c) it is fraudulent; 
(d) it involves or implies injury to the person or property of another; or 
(e) the court regards it as immoral, or opposed to public policy. 
In each of the above cases, the consideration or object of an agreement is said to 
be unlawful. Every agreement of which the object or consideration is unlawful is 
void.
The foregoing section 24 is then followed by several other provisions under 
the heading ‘Void Agreements’ in the Contracts Act providing further categories of 
contracts that would be considered void at common law but not necessarily illegal,
namely: - 
(1) Section 25 – an agreement is void if the consideration for one or more objects
is in part unlawful. 
(2) Section 26 – an agreement made without consideration is void except in the 
circumstances provided. 
(3) Section 27 – an agreement in restraint of marriage of a person other than a
minor is void. 
4 Vohrah, B. & Wu, Min Aun, “The Commercial Law of Malaysia.” (Malaysia: Longman, 2004), pp.
120.
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(4) Section 28 – an agreement in restraint of trade, profession or business is void 
except in certain limited circumstances.
(5) Section 29 – an agreement in restraint of legal proceedings is void except 
contracts to refer a dispute to arbitration and certain written agreements
relating to award of scholarships by the Government.
(6) Section 30 – agreements that are uncertain are void. 
(7) Section 31 – an agreement by way of wager is void except a subscription or 
contribution made in favour of certain prizes for horse-racing. 
It is unclear if the foregoing provisions of the Contracts Act in fact cover all 
common law categories of void contracts, and the uncertainty is further clouded by 
the tendency of courts to gloss over and in some cases, simply ignore them, and 
instead apply the common law.5 In several cases when references were made to
provisions of the Contracts Act, the courts did not identify with any certainty the
particular subsections which were being relied upon.6 There is a tendency to rely
heavily on principles of English law, whether consciously or otherwise, without
adequate regard for the local statute and the environment in which it operates.7
3.2 Contracts With Mistakes – Section 21, 22 & 23
Sometimes, the parties may conclude their agreement on the basis of a
mistake. In certain circumstances such an error may vitiate the contract to the point
of rendering it a nullity.8 In Malaysia, the effect of mistake on agreement is dealt
5 Vohrah, B. & Wu, Min Aun, “The Commercial Law of Malaysia.” (Malaysia: Longman, 2004), pp.
121.
6 Leong Poh Chin v. Chin Thin Sin [1959] MLJ 246; Hassan v. Ismail [1970] 1 MLJ 210; Ahamd
Udoh v. Aik Chong [1970] 1 MLJ 82. 
7 Vohrah, B. & Wu, Min Aun, “The Commercial Law of Malaysia.” (Malaysia: Longman, 2004), pp.
121.
8 Anderson, A.J.; Smith, S.B.; Palmer, N.E.; Cooper, R.R., “Emden’s Construction Law.” Volume 1. 
8th Edition. (London: Butterworth, 1990), pp. 97. 
38
with by sections 21 to 23 of the Contracts Act. It is perhaps worthwhile to note the 
following matters in respect of mistake under the law of contract9: - 
(1) It is exclusively concerned with a mistake of one or more parties at the time
of formation of the contract; 
(2) It is unclear if the traditional English law classification of mistake into 
common, mutual and unilateral mistakes is applicable in Malaysia; 
(3) If  a person is led by a misrepresentation to make a mistake as to the quality 
of the subject matter of a contract, the remedy lies with fraud or 
misrepresentation 10 rather than mistake ‘unless it is the mistake of both
parties, and is as to the existence of some quality which makes the thing
without the quality essentially different from the thing as it was believed to 
be’;
(4) The legal meaning of ‘mistake’ is more restricted than the meaning in 
common parlance.
 In Tamplin v. James11, B made a successful bid at an auction for the sale of a 
public house under the mistaken belief that a certain field was included in the lot 
when in fact, it was not. The contract was held to be valid by the English court. 
Under the Contracts Act, this issue would have been covered by section 23, which 
provides: - 
A contract is not voidable merely because it was caused by one of the parties to it 
being under a mistake as to a matter of fact. 
Section 21 provides for a mistake made by both parties to an agreement. It
reads: - 
9 Vohrah, B. & Wu, Min Aun, “The Commercial Law of Malaysia.” (Malaysia: Longman, 2004), pp.
110.
10 Refer para 2.3 and para 2.4 in Chapter 2. 
11 [1898] 15 Ch D 215. 
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Where both parties to an agreement are under a mistake as to a matter of fact 
essential to the agreement, the agreement is void. 
Explanation – An erroneous opinion as to the value of the thing which forms the 
subject-matter of the agreement is not to be deemed a mistake as to a matter of 
fact.
For a mistake to be operative under this section, it must be a mistake of both parties 
and it is as to ‘a matter of fact essential to the agreement’. It appears to cover the
English common law classification of common mistake and mutual mistake. In 
English law, operative mistake, which always render a contract void ab initio and not 
voidable, covers the following two types of mistake12: - 
i) Common mistake occurs when both parties both parties make the same
mistake as to a fact fundamental to the agreement such as existence of the 
subject matter of the contract. 
ii) Mutual mistake occurs when both parties misunderstands each other and are
at cross-purposes so that, in fact, there is no agreement on the same thing in
the same sense, i.e. there is no consent. 
In Raffles v. Wichelhaus13, a classic English case, two parties agreed to a sale
of a cargo of a button arriving in London by a ship called The Peerless, sailing from
Bombay. But unknown to both parties, there were two ships of the name both leaving 
from Bombay at different times. They were both negotiating under a mistake and had 
in mind different ships, and therefore, the contract of sale was ruled void for mutual
mistake. In another English case, Scriven Brothers & Co. v. Hindley & Co.14, an 
auctioneer put up for sale some lots of hemp and tow. Owing to ambiguity in the 
auction particulars, the defendant bid an excessive price for an item of tow, thinking 
it was hemp. From the price bid, the auctioneer must have realized there was a
mistake. It was held that there was no contract.
12 Wallace, I.N.D., “Hudson’s Building & Engineering Contracts.” 11th Edition, Volume 1, (London:
Sweet & Maxwell, 1995), pp. 48. 
13 [1864] H & C 906. 
14 [1913] 3 KB 564. 
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The second aspect of section 21 deals with a mistake as to ‘a matter essential 
to the agreement’. There appears to be no local authority on this point15, but this 
issue was considered by the Privy Council in Sheikh Brothers Ltd v. Ochsner16. In 
that case, the appellant company granted to the first respondent licence and authority 
to cut, decorticate, process and manufacture all sisal then or at any time growing on 
certain lands, and the license undertook, inter alia, that he would manufacture and 
deliver to the appellant or its agents for sale sisal fibre in average minimum
quantities of 50 tons per month. Among the questions in dispute was whether the
agreement was void under section 20 of the Indian Contract Act, which is in pari
materia with section 21 of the Contracts Act, by reason of mutual mistake of fact 
inasmuch as both parties believed, contrary to fact, that the leaf potential of the sisal 
area would be sufficient to permit the manufacture and delivery of the stipulated 
minimum quantities throughout the term of the licence. It was contended for the 
appellant before the court that the mistake was not as to a matter essential to the
agreement. Lord Cohen opined that having regard to the nature of the contract, which 
was a kind of joint venture, it was the basis of the contract that the sisal area should 
be capable of producing an average of 50 tons a month throughout the term of the 
licence, and thus the mistake was as to a matter of fact essential to the agreement.
His Lordship then went on to say that since mistake within the section having been 
found to exist at the date of the license agreement, ‘it necessarily follows that the 
licence agreement is not a contract within section 10’. 
The law relating to the mistake of one party only, that is, unilateral mistake, is 
provided in section 23 of the Contacts Act. It does appear that if the contract is clear,
unilateral mistake will not affect the validity of a contract because a person is 
expected to take reasonable care to ascertain what he is contracting about.17 There 
may be other reasons to avoid the contract such as fraud or misrepresentation. To 
what extent is the English law on unilateral mistake applicable in Malaysia is unclear
15 Vohrah, B. & Wu, Min Aun, “The Commercial Law of Malaysia.” (Malaysia: Longman, 2004), pp.
112.
16 [1957] AC 126. 
17 Guest, A.G., “Anson’s Law of Contract.” 24th Edition. (London: Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1975),
pp. 310. 
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at this stage because section 22 of the Contracts Act suggests that the local law may
be different from English law. 
Under English law, unilateral mistake arises when one party makes a mistake
and the other party knows or is taken to know that he is making a mistake, and this
contract will be void.18 In Hartog v. Colin & Shields19, an offer was accepted to sell
certain Argentine hareskin at a certain price per pound. In the negotiations, however, 
there was an understanding that the skins were quoted at a price per piece and it was 
also the trade custom to fix the price by reference to piece. The contract was held
void for mistake. The buyer could not reasonably have supposed that the offer
expressed the real intention of the offeror, and must have known that it was made
under a mistake.20
3.2.1 Mistake As To Document 
One party may have made a mistake as to the nature of a document he has 
signed. The general position is that a person is bound by the terms of the contract that 
he signs and this is firmly established in the English case, L’ Estrange v. F. 
Graucob21 and accepted in Malaysia.22 Commonly, a mistake which merely goes to 
the motive or purpose of one the parties cannot prevent the formation of a contract.23
In Subramaniam v. Retnam24, the High Court applied the principle despite the fact 
that the defendant who had signed a written acknowledgement in the English 
language of a loan was ignorant of the language, seeing that there was no fraud or 
misrepresentation.
18 Elliott, C. & Quinn, F., “Contract Law.” 4th Edition. (London: Longman, 2003), pp. 171. 
19 [1939] 3 All ER 566. 
20 Cundy v. Lindsay [1878] 3 App Cas 459; Philips v. Brooks [1919] 2 KB 243; Ingram v. Little
[1960] 3 All 332; Lewis v. Averay [1971] 1 QB 198.
21 [1934] 2 KB 394. 
22 Vohrah, B. & Wu, Min Aun, “The Commercial Law of Malaysia.” (Malaysia: Longman, 2004), pp.
114.
23 City of Calgary v. Northen Construction [1986] 2 WWR 426. 
24 [1966] 1 MLJ 172. 
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There is no specific provision in the Contracts Act in respect of the defence 
of non est factum25, as allowed in English law26 in Foster v. Mackinnon27, but it has
prevented local courts from applying the principle in Awang bin Omar v. Haji Omar 
& Anor28. This action arose from a contract between the plaintiff and the second 
defendant, the performance of which was guaranteed by the first defendant who was 
induced by the second defendant, his brother, to sign the document. The first 
defendant did not know English and was persuaded to sign in the mistaken belief that 
he was merely witnessing his brother’s signature. The High Court found there was a 
mistake as to the nature of the document signed and therefore, the first defendant was 
not liable. It should be borne in mind that, the burden of proof of mistake is on the 
party making the claim and the law requires strong and clear evidence for its 
discharge.29 As per Laville J. in this case, the defendant has to prove that had he 
known the class and character of the document in question, he would not have signed 
it’.
 In Datin Zainun bt. Ismail v. Tuan Minah bt. Syed Abdul Rahman & Anor30,
the plaintiff sued for a sum of money being interest and costs of a loan made to the 
defendant who resisted the claim and pleaded fraud and non est factum. The High 
Court held that the burden of proof of fraud lies in the defendant and fraud could not 
be presumed from mere circumstances or suspicion. In this instance, the defence 
could not succeed as the defendant had not discharged the burden.
25 A plea that an agreement (originally a deed) mentioned in the statement of case was not the act of 
the defendant. It can be used as defence to actions based on mistakes in documents when the
defendant was fundamentally mistaken as to the character or effect of the transaction embodied in
the document. [as per Martin E. A., “Oxford Dictionary of Law.” 5th Edition. (UK: Oxford
University Press, 2003), pp. 331].
26 Wallace, I.N.D., “Hudson’s Building & Engineering Contracts.” 11th Edition, Volume 1, (London:
Sweet & Maxwell, 1995), pp. 51. 
27 [1869] LR 4 CP 704. 
28 [1949] MLJ Supp 28. 
29 Vohrah, B. & Wu, Min Aun, “The Commercial Law of Malaysia.” (Malaysia: Longman, 2004), pp.
115.
30 [1980] 1 MLJ 100. 
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3.3 Contracts Offending The Law – Section 24(a) & (b) 
A contract may constitute a crime or a tort and the violation may be of a 
statutory rule or of common law.31 The federal and state legislatures may enact laws 
forbidding certain types of contracts and in certain instances, declare that they are 
void.32 In considering the enforceability of contracts, the judiciary will often need to
determine the elusive legislative intent from a construction of the statute. In this
respect, it may helpful to refer to the Australian case, Yango Pastoral Co. Pty Ltd & 
Ors v. First Chicago Australia Ltd & Ors33. Gibbs A. C. J. in this case neatly sums
up the four main ways in which the enforceability of a contract may be affected by a 
statutory provision which renders particular contracts unlawful: - 
(1) The contract may be to do something which the statute forbids; 
(2) The contract may be one which the statute expressly or impliedly prohibits; 
(3) The contract, although lawful on its face, may be made in order to effect a 
purpose which the statute renders unlawful; or 
(4) The contract, although lawful according to its own terms, may be performed
in a manner which the statute prohibits. 
In Asia Television Ltd & Anor v. Viwa Video Sdn. Bhd. & Connected Cases34,
the appellant claimed copyright in certain films in video cassette form, alleging 
infringement by the respondents. The appellants’ claim to copyright was based on 
publication within the provisions of section 2(2)(c) of the Copyright Act 1969. 
However, the Films (Censorship) Act 1952 provides for censorship of films
including video, and imposes a penalty for non-compliance with prescribed 
procedures which, inter alia, includes the issue of a certificate of approval by the 
authority. The issue was the effect of non-compliance with provisions of the latter 
Act on the question of acquisition of copyright under the Copyright Act. The 
31 Elliott, C. & Quinn, F., “Contract Law.” 4th Edition. (London: Longman, 2003), pp. 182. 
32 Vohrah, B. & Wu, Min Aun, “The Commercial Law of Malaysia.” (Malaysia: Longman, 2004), pp.
121.
33 [1978] 139 CLR 410. 
34 [1984] 2 MLJ 304. 
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appellant had not been issued with a certificate from the authority under the Films
(Censorship) Act. Abdoolcader F. J., delivering the judgment of the Federal Court, 
cited with approval the following statement of Megarry J. in Curragh Investment Ltd
v. Cook35: - 
“… where a contract is made in contravention of some statutory provision then, 
in addition to any criminal sanctions, the courts may in some cases find that the 
contract itself is stricken with illegality. But for this to occur, there must be a 
sufficient nexus between the statutory requirements and the contract … There are 
today countless statutory requirements of one kind or another, yet I cannot 
believe that an individual or a company who is in breach of any of these 
requirements (for example, under the Factories Act) is thereby disabled from 
making a legal contract for the sale of land, or validly entering into a covenant 
for title.” 
After considering the relevant statutory provisions and the question of 
interplay between them, their Lordships concluded that there was insufficient nexus 
such as would satisfy the test laid down in the Curragh Investment case. In their 
views, there was no prohibition in either of the Acts which would preclude the
appellants from acquiring copyright if they were otherwise qualified, although they 
might have been in breach of the Films (Censorship) Act which was concerned with 
criminal liability and provided penalties for breach. Consequently, non-compliance
with provisions of that Act did not affect the acquisition of copyright under the 
Copyright Act.
Their Lordships also referred to the Privy Council decision in Batu Pahat 
Bank Ltd v. Official Assignee of the Property of Tan Keng Tin, A Bankrupt36 which
held that a section of the Companies Ordinance did not invalidate a security given in 
contravention of a subsection thereof which provided that no banking company
should lend any part of its funds on the security of its own shares. 
35 [1974] 1 WLR 1559. 
36 [1933] AC 691. 
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The test laid down by Megarry   J. in the Curragh Investment case was also 
applied in Hopewell Construction Co. Ltd v. Eastern Oriental Hotel37 where the
plaintiff company incorporated in Hong Kong entered into a contract for construction 
of a building in Penang. The issue before the High Court whether the contract was 
void on account of the fact that the plaintiff, being a foreign company, did not
register itself in Malaysia as required by the Companies Act 1965. Zakaria Yatim J.
in applying the principle established by Megarry J. addressed these two questions: - 
(b) whether the Companies Act prohibits the making of a contract of the type in 
question; and 
(c) whether the Companies Act provides that one of the parties must satisfy 
certain requirements before making such a contract. 
His Lordship noted that in order to render the contract void under section 24(b) of the 
Contracts Act, there must be a sufficient nexus between the provisions of the 
Companies Act and the contract in dispute. His Lordship could find no such 
connection: the Companies Act neither prohibited the making of such contracts nor
laid down any requirement for foreign companies to comply in respect of such
contracts. The question of public policy under section 24(e) of the Contracts Act was
also considered and rejected as not applicable to the contract in dispute. 
The effect on a contract prohibited by statute was also considered in Chung
Khiaw Bank Ltd v. Hotel Rasa Sayang Sdn. Bhd. & Anor38. In this case, Hashim 
Yeop A Sani C.J. examined various authorities including the Australian case, Yango
Pastoral Co. Pty Ltd & Ors v. First Chicago Australia Ltd & Ors39, and concluded: - 
“… it may be stated as a general principle that a contract the making of which is 
prohibited by statute expressly or by implication, shall be void and unenforceable 
unless the statute itself saves the contract or there are contrary intentions which 
can reasonably be read from the language of the statute itself.”
37 [1988] 2 MLJ 621. 
38 [1990] 1 MLJ 356. 
39 [1978] 139 CLR 410. 
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In reference to parts of section 24, his Lordship said: - 
“Paragraphs (a), (b) and (e) of section 24 of the Contracts Act 1950 should be 
read disjunctively. Section 24 of the Contracts Act is explicit and that if an 
agreement is forbidden by law or prohibited by law or of such nature that it 
would defeat the law, that agreement is unlawful and void. If the agreement is 
prohibited by law or forbidden by law or of such nature that it would defeat the 
law then the question of public policy does not arise at all. The question of public 
policy arises only in para (e) where the court considers an agreement to be 
immoral or otherwise opposed to public policy.” 
Several local cases involving unlicensed money lending, transfer of forestry 
licences and dealings with Temporary Occupation Licence (T.O.L.) in contravention 
of statutory provisions have been held to be illegal. Those cases, for example, are: - 
(1) Hee Cheng v. Krishnan 40 - the sale and purchase contract between the
plaintiff and defendant was unlawful by reason of section 24 of the Contracts 
Act.
(2) Murugesan v. Khrisnasamy & Anor41 - the promise to allow the purchaser to
enter the lands and occupy it was an attempt to transfer to him a part of the
promisor’s rights under the T.O.L. and therefore void.
(3) Menaka v. Lum Kum Chum42 - the contract and the security having been
made in contravention of the Moneylenders Ordinance 1951 were void and 
unenforceable.
(4) Wai Hin Tin Co. Ltd v. Lee Chow Beng43 - the loan, which in contravention of 
the Companies Ordinance 1940, was illegal. 
(5) Govindji & Co. v. Soon Hin Huat44 - the sale agreement was void as being
contrary to the Federal Agricultural Marketing Authority Act 1965. 
40 [1955] MLJ 103. 
41 [1958] MLJ 92. 
42 [1977] 1 MLJ 91. 
43 [1968] 2 MLJ 251. 
44 [1982] 1 MLJ 255. 
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(6) Yeep Mooi v. Chu Chin Chua45 - the transactions involving borrowing money
in contravention of the Borrowing Companies Act 1969 were illegal and 
therefore void under section 2(g) and 24 of the Contracts Act. 
3.4 Contracts That Are Fraudulent – Section 24(c) 
An agreement whose consideration or object is fraudulent is unlawful. This 
category of contract is different from fraudulent misrepresentation where one is 
fraudulently induced by another to enter into a contract. The essence of section 24(c) 
is fraudulent object or misrepresentation.46 For example, as provided in Illustration 
(e) of section 24, an agreement for the division of gains acquired or to be acquired by 
fraud is void because its object is unlawful. Also, in Illustration (g), in the 
relationship between principal and agent, there is the fraud of concealment if A, the 
agent, agrees for money and without the knowledge of his principal, to obtain for B a
lease of land belonging to his principal. In the law of agency, the agent is unlawfully 
receiving a secret profit.47
3.5 Contracts Injurious To Person Or Property Of Another – Section 24(d) 
An agreement is unlawful if the consideration or object involves or implies 
injury to the person or property of another, as provided in section 24(d) of the 
Contracts Act. This subsection is applicable to damage to property of another as well 
as injury to person. Thus if two parties conspire for profit to cause physical damage
45 [1981] 1 MLJ 14. 
46 Vohrah, B. & Wu, Min Aun, “The Commercial Law of Malaysia.” (Malaysia: Longman, 2004), pp.
129.
47 Mahesan v. Malaysia Government Officers’ Cooperative Housing Society Ltd [1979] AC 274 (PC).
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to the house of a third person or to cause him physical harm, the agreement is 
unlawful. There is a reported case on this subsection, Syed Ahamed v. Puteh binte 
Sabtu48, where the defendant agreed to sell a property of the plaintiff in which an 
infant had an interest. The dealing was detrimental to the infant’s interest and 
consequently, it was struck down by the court. 
3.6 Contracts That Are Immoral Or Against Public Policy – Section 24(e) 
Section 24(e) of the Contracts Act covers two aspects, i.e. immorality and
public policy. 
3.6.1 Immorality 
The English common law on immorality is restricted to sexual immorality49
though it has been suggested that it could be wider. Hence a contract involving 
prostitution, which is contrary to good morals, is illegal.50 In Malaysia, however, it is
submitted that the rule is not so restricted and courts may apply it to other areas of 
immorality.51 This view is supported by, for instance, Illustration (j) to section 24 
which gives the example of a solicitor, A, who promises to pay exercise his influence 
over B, his client, in favour of C, who promises to pay him $1,000 for the effort. The 
promise is said to be void because it is immoral. Meanwhile, in Aroomogum Chitty v. 
Lim Ah Hang52, it was held that money lent on a promisory note for purpose of 
48 [1922] 5 FMSLR 243. 
49 E.g. in case of Pearce v. Brooks [1861] All ER Rep. 102. 
50 Barker, D. & Padfield, C., “Law Made Simple.” 11th Edition. (Amsterdam: Made Simple Books,
2003), pp. 147. 
51 Vohrah, B. & Wu, Min Aun, “The Commercial Law of Malaysia.” (Malaysia: Longman, 2004), pp.
121.
52 [1894] 2 SSLR 80. 
49
running a brothel was held not recoverable on the grounds of illegality and 
immorality.
3.6.2 Public Policy
Public policy assumes that there are some interests which are shared by most 
of society, which promote the smooth running of the type of society we have, and 
which should therefore be protected.53 So, contracts are said to be against public 
policy when they tend to bring about a state of affairs which is regarded by law as
harmful to society. What is ‘harmful’ depends on the circumstances of the case 
although the rules already established by precedent are sometimes moulded to fit the
new conditions of a changing society. However, the courts in Malaysia have taken 
view, consistent with English law, that the doctrine of public policy will not be
extended beyond the classes of cases already covered by them.54 This restrictive
approach was adopted in Theresa Chong v. Kin Khoon & Co55. The court ruled that 
the appellant-defendant must settle on a contract though made in contravention of the 
by-laws of the Stock Exchange which imposed a penalty on the plaintiffs-
respondents. The plaintiffs-respondents might have breached the by-laws of the
Stock Exchange by dealing with an unregistered remisier but such dealing did not 
make the contract illegal as being opposed to public policy. 
In Sinyium Anak Mutut v. Datuk Ong Kee Hui 56 , it was held that the
contractual arrangements between the plaintiff and defendant were void as they 
against public policy and the liberty of a Member of the Dewan Rakyat. Also, in 
Amalgated Steel Mills Bhd v. Ingeback (Malaysia) Sdn Bhd57, the court held that an
agreement for the purposes of evading the Stamp Ordinance 1949 as attempting
53 Elliott, C. & Quinn, F., “Contract Law.” 4th Edition. (London: Longman, 2003), pp. 187. 
54 Vohrah, B. & Wu, Min Aun, “The Commercial Law of Malaysia.” (Malaysia: Longman, 2004), pp.
131.
55 [1976] 2 MLJ 253. 
56 [1982] 1 MLJ.
57 [1990] 2 MLJ 374. 
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fraud against the revenue department and third parties, and deriving profits therefrom
was illegal. 
As summarised by Vohrah & Wu Min Aun (2004), the followings are the 
contracts which offend public policy: -
i) Contracts prejudicial to the public service
Illustration (f) to section 24 gives the example of a promise by one to obtain 
for another an appointment to the public service in return for a payment. Such 
a contract is illegal and probably covers the principle establish in the English
case, Parkinson v. College of Ambulance Ltd & Harrison58.
ii) Contracts that impede the course of justice
Illustration (h) to section 24 provides an example of A promising to drop a
prosecution for robbery against B if B agrees to restore the value of the things
taken. The agreement is void as offending public policy. 
iii) Contracts against the interest of the state
In Regazzono v. K. C. Sethia (1944) Ltd59, the defendant entered into an 
agreement to sell Indian jute bags to the plaintiff, and conspired to ship them 
to Genoa with the intention that they be reshipped to South Africa in 
contravention of an Indian regulation imposing an embargo on trade between 
India and South Africa. The contract was held to be against public policy.
iv) Contracts prejudicial to the freedom and stability of marriage
A contract is void if it unduly restricts a person’s ability to marry whom he 
will60, or if already married, encourages acts which weakens its stability
subject of course, to recognised idiosyncrasies of cultural and religions 
groups. Also, a marriage brokerage contract whereby a contract to find a 
spouse for a person in return for a fee is void as offending public policy. This 
58 [1925] 2 KB 1. 
59 [1958] AC 301. 
60 Section 27 of the Contracts Act.
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rule has been upheld in Khem Singh v. Arokh Singh 61  and subsequently
followed in Alang Kangkong bin Kulop Brahim v. Pandak Brahim62.
3.7 Contracts Where Its Consideration For One Or More Objects Is In Part
Unlawful – Section 25 
Section 25 of Contracts Act states that: ‘If any part of a single consideration 
for one or more objects, or any one or any part of any one of several considerations 
for a single object, is unlawful, the agreement is void.’ In simple words, it would 
mean that no consideration shall be unlawful for a valid contract. For an example, as 
illustrated in section 25: - 
A promises to superintend, on behalf of B, a legal manufacture of indigo, and an 
illegal traffic in other articles. B promises to pay to A a salary of RM10,000 a 
year. The agreement is void as the object of A’s promise and the consideration 
for B’s promise, being in part unlawful. 
Further to this example, the case of Chung Khiaw Bank Bhd v Hotel Rasa 
Sayang Sdn Bhd & Anor63 is worth to be referred. In 1980, Chung Khiaw Bank Ltd 
granted a loan to Johore Tenggara Sdn Bhd to facilitate the purchase by the directors 
of the company of the shares of Hotel Rasa Sayang Bhd. This loan was inter alia
secured by a charge overland owned by the said hotel and a debenture on all the 
hotel’s assets. The High Court held that the hotel had given financial assistance 
contravening section 67 of the Companies Act, 1965 by way of providing security in 
connection with the purchase of shares in the company (the hotel) itself. The loan 
was held to be illegal and void. 
61 [1930] 7 FMSLR 199. 
62 [1934] MLJ 65. 
63 [1990] 1 MLJ 356. 
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It is worth to know that this provision is not totally applicable in English law.
In United Kingdom, where the consideration for a contract is substantially untainted 
by illegality, it will be enforced even though there may be a subsidiary illegal
element.64
3.8 Contracts Made Without Consideration – Section 26 
A contract is an agreement with considerations and consideration flows both 
ways between the contracting parties.65 Section 26 provides that ‘an agreement made 
without consideration is void’ unless they belong to one of those categories of 
agreements listed in the same section as being exempted from the rule. Consideration
is defined in section 2(d) as: - 
when, at the desire of the promisor, the promisee or any other person has done or 
abstained from doing, or does or abstains from doing, or promises to do or to 
abstain from doing, something, such act or abstinence or promise is called a 
consideration of the promise; 
Consideration may be viewed as sort of bargain, a quid pro quo or the price which
one party pays to buy the promise or act of the other. When a promisor promises to 
do or to abstain from doing something, the promisee must pay a price for it. This 
price to be paid may be an act or an abstinence or a promise to perform a future act
or abstinence. 66  Generally, consideration involves either some detriment to the 
promisee or some benefit to the promisor.67
64 Bull v. Pitney Bowes Ltd [1966] 3 All ER 384. 
65 Collier, K., “Construction Contracts.” 3rd Edition, (New Jersey: Merrill Prentice Hall, 2001), pp. 9. 
66 Vohrah, B. & Wu, Min Aun, “The Commercial Law of Malaysia.” (Malaysia: Longman, 2004), pp.
29.
67 Anderson, A.J.; Smith, S.B.; Palmer, N.E.; Cooper, R.R., “Emden’s Construction Law.” Volume 1.
8th Edition. (London: Butterworth, 1990), pp. 82. 
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In accordance with Vohrah and Wu Min Aun (2004), consideration may be 
classified as: - 
a) Executory Consideration
A consideration is executory when one promise is made in return for another, 
i.e. a promise in return for a promise. For example, X agrees to sell Y a 
motorcycle and Y promises to pay RM2,000 for it. 
b) Executed Consideration
A consideration is executed when a promise is made in return for the
performance of an act. For example, X offers RM100 to anyone who finds
and returns his camera which he has earlier lost. Y finds and returns the
camera in response to the offer. Y’s consideration for X’s promise is executed, 
and only X’s liability remains outstanding. 
c) Past Consideration
Where a promise is made subsequent to and in return for an act that has 
already been performed, the promise is made on account of a past 
consideration. So, if Y finds and returns X’s camera and in gratitude, X
promises to reward him with RM100, the promise is made in return for a 
prior act.
Under the Contracts Act, any one of the above considerations is sufficient to 
support a promise. However, past consideration generally constitutes no 
consideration in English law.68 In particular, section 2(d) and 26(b) apply to past 
consideration. The words ‘has done or abstained from doing’ in section 2(d) suggest 
that an act prior to the promise would be sufficient to constitute consideration even 
though it is clearly past, provided it is done ‘at the desire of the promisor’. Section 
2(d) does not cover all cases of past consideration. So section 26(b) picks up 
additional areas although the courts have given it a somewhat restricted meaning.
68 Anderson, A.J.; Smith, S.B.; Palmer, N.E.; Cooper, R.R., “Emden’s Construction Law.” Volume 1.
8th Edition. (London: Butterworth, 1990), pp. 84. 
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Illustration (c) of section 26 lends further support to the view that past consideration 
in the circumstances provided constitutes a valid consideration. It provides: - 
A finds B’s purse and gives it to him. B promises to give A $50. This is a contract. 
Nevertheless, in section 26, there are also exceptions to the general rule 
which an agreement is not void even though it has no consideration. Vohrah and Wu
Min Aun (2004) have summarised those exceptions as follow: - 
(a) An agreement made on account of natural love and affection 
(b) An agreement to compensate for a past voluntary act. 
(c) An agreement to compensate a person who did an act which the promisor was 
legally compellable to do. 
(d) An agreement to pay a statute-barred debt. 
3.9 Contracts In Restraint Of Marriage – Section 27 
Such agreements, in so far as they restrain the freedom of marriage, are 
discouraged on public grounds as injurious to the moral welfare of the citizen.69
Thus, a promise under seal by a man ‘not to marry with any person besides Mrs 
Catherine Lowe; and if I do, to pay the said Mrs Catherine Lowe the sum of £2,000’
was held void, as there was purely restricted.70 Section 27 of the Contracts Act has 
provided that “every agreement in restraint of the marriage of any person, other than 
a minor during his or her minority, is void”.
69 Guest, A.G., “Anson’s Law of Contract.” 24th Edition. (London: Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1975),
pp. 344. 
70 Lowe v. Peers [1978] 4 Burr 2225. 
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3.10 Contracts In Restraint Of Trade – Section 28 
In English law, contracts in restraint of trade are prima facie illegal and void 
but the presumption may be rebutted by showing that the restraint is reasonable 
between the parties and to the interests of the public.71 The policy and principle of 
the law is summarised by Lord Mac Naghten in Nordenfelt v. Maxim Nordenfelt 
Guns and Ammunition Co. Ltd72: - 
“The public have an interest in every person’s carrying on his trade freely: so 
has the individual. All interference with individual liberty of action in trading, 
and all restraints of trade of themselves, if there is nothing more, are contrary to 
public policy, and therefore void. That is the general rule. But there are 
exceptions: restraints of trade and interference with individual liberty of action
may be justified by the special circumstances of a particular case. It is sufficient 
justification, and indeed it is the only justification, if the restriction is reasonable, 
that is, in reference to the interest of the parties concerned and reasonable in 
reference to the interests of the public, so framed and so guarded as to afford 
adequate protection to the party in whose favour it is imposed, while at the same 
time it is in no way injurious to the public.”
The provision on contracts in restraint of trade is more restrictive than its
English counterpart. Section 28 of the Contracts Act states: - 
Every agreement by which anyone is restrained from exercising a lawful 
profession, trade, or business of any kind, is to that extent void. 
Exception 1 – One who sells the goodwill of a business may agree with the buyer 
to refrain carrying on a similar business, within specified local limits, so long as 
71 Barker, D. & Padfield, C., “Law Made Simple.” 11th Edition. (Amsterdam: Made Simple Books,
2003), pp. 148. 
72 [1894] AC 535. 
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the buyer, or any person deriving title to the goodwill from him, carries on a like 
business therein: 
Provided that such limits appear to the court reasonable, regard being had to the 
nature of the business. 
Exception 2 – Partners may, upon or in anticipation of a dissolution of the 
partnership, agree that some or all of them will not carry on a business similar to
that of the partnership within such local limits as are referred to in exception 1. 
Exception 3 – Partners may agree that some one or all of them will not carry on 
any business, other than that of the partnership, during the continuance of the 
partnership.
A strict interpretation of section 28 of the Contracts Act renders all contracts
in restraint of trade void even though a covenant may be reasonable. Such an 
approach was taken by Hashim J. in Wrigglesworth v. Anthony Wilson73  which 
concern an agreement entered into between the plaintiff and the defendant whereby 
the latter was refrained from practising as an advocate and solicitor within five miles
of Kota Bahru town for a period of two years after the termination of his service
contract with his employer. The defendant left the employment and set up a practice 
in Kota Bahru town in breach of the promise. The plaintiff applied for an injunction
to restrain the defendant from practising. The High Court held the restraint void, 
rejecting the application of English law. The literal interpretation of section 28 would 
in effect render void some forms of mercantile contracts unless courts are prepared to 
get around the question by adopting a more liberal approach. 
An Indian Supreme Court case of Superintendence Company of India (P) Ltd
v. Krishnan Murgai74 decided on a provision similar to section 28, lend support to 
the view that the local provision is different from English law. 
73 [1964] MLJ 269. 
74 AIR 1980 SC 1717. 
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3.11 Contracts In Restraint Of Legal Proceedings – Section 29 
According to section 29 of the Contracts Act, an agreement whereby a person
‘is restricted from enforcing his rights under or in respect of any contract, by the
usual legal proceedings in the ordinary tribunal, or which limits the time within
which he may thus enforce his rights, is void to that extent.’ Under the English law,
this restraint is classified as contracts seeking to oust the jurisdiction of the courts, 
and so they are void to that extent as being contrary to public policy. However, 
section 29 goes further by making void those agreements that limits the time within 
which a person may enforce his rights subject, of course, to the qualification that any 
time limit must be within the period for bringing an action prescribed by the 
Limitation Ordinance 1953.75
 In Corporation Royal Exchange v. Teck Guan76, a clause in a fire insurance 
policy stated that ‘If the claim be made and rejected, and an action or suit be not 
commenced within three months after such rejection, all benefit under this policy 
shall be forfeited.’ The court concluded that this clause reduced the period within
which an assured might bring a suit for compensation to a period less than sanctioned 
by the limitation statute. Hence, the clause infringed section 28 of the Contracts 
Enactment [now section 29 of the Contracts Act] and was therefore, to that extent,
void.
Three exceptions to the general rule have been created. Exception 1 and 2 
deal with a reference to arbitration and merely incorporate a long recognised rule in 
English rule that an arbitration agreement is valid if it merely seeks to make a 
reference to arbitration a condition precedent to any recourse to the court.77 Both 
exceptions are as below: - 
75 Vohrah, B. & Wu, Min Aun, “The Commercial Law of Malaysia.” (Malaysia: Longman, 2004), pp.
141.
76 [1912] 2 FMSLR 92. 
77 Scott v. Avery [1836] 5 HL Cas 811; Vohrah, B. & Wu, Min Aun, “The Commercial Law of
Malaysia.” (Malaysia: Longman, 2004), pp. 141. 
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Exception 1 – This section shall not render illegal a contract by which two or 
more persons agree that any dispute which may arise between them in respect of
any subject or class of subjects shall be referred to arbitration, and that only the 
amount awarded in the arbitration shall be recoverable in respect of the dispute
so referred. 
Exception 2 – Nor shall this section render illegal any contract in writing, by 
which two or more persons agree to refer to arbitration any question between 
them which has already arisen, or affect any law as to references to arbitration. 
A related issue is the common practice of inserting rules in associations and 
clubs referring disputes to domestic tribunals. Such rules are binding though subject
to the overriding jurisdiction of the court. The state of the law was summarised by 
Lord Denning in Lee v. Showmen’s Guild of Great Britain78: -
“Parties cannot by contract oust the ordinary courts from their jurisdiction. They 
can, of course, agree to leave questions of law, as well as questions of fact, to the 
decision of the domestic tribunal. They can, indeed, make the tribunal the final 
arbiter on questions of fact, but they cannot make it the final arbiter on question 
of law. They cannot prevent its decision being examined by the courts. If parties 
should seek, by agreement, to take the law out of the hands of the courts and put 
it into the hands of a private tribunal, without any recourse at all to the courts in 
cases of error of law, then the agreement is to that extent contrary to public 
policy and void.”
 In Kolandaisamy v. Annamalai & The Harbour Trade Union (Selangor) Port 
Swettenham79, the plaintiff claimed that he was still a member of the union and 
sought a declaration from the court that the election of members to the executive 
council of the union was null and void. On a preliminary point, the court had to 
decide whether it had jurisdiction to hear and adjudicate upon the matter in the light 
78 [1952] 2 QB 329. 
79 [1968] 1 MLJ 222. 
59
of union rules providing that any dispute between a member and the union should be 
decided by reference to arbitration. The court, giving effect to the rule, declined to 
exercise jurisdiction, declaring that the only way in which the case could go before it 
was by way of a case stated for its opinion on a point of law.80 Rules such as these
have generally been interpreted as procedural and not intended to oust the 
jurisdiction of the court.81
 In Kok Wee Kiat & Ors v. Chong Hon Nyan82 , two further views were 
expressed by the court: - 
i) It was of the opinion that a member could seek judicial redress without 
exhausting the domestic processes if there were evidence that the position of 
the member would be jeopardized by a failure to resolve the dispute 
expeditiously;
ii) A member need not pursue the domestic remedies if the constitution of the 
association purports to completely shut off its members from having recourse 
to the courts. 
The third exception of section 29 of the Contracts Act concerns the exercise
of governmental discretion under a written contract of scholarship. It reads: - 
Exception 3 – nor shall this section render illegal any contract in writing
between the Government and any person with respect to an award of a 
scholarship by the Government wherein it is provided that the discretion
exercised by the Government under that contract shall be final and conclusive 
and shall not be questioned by any court. 
80 Arbitration generally is governed by the Arbitration Act 1950 (Revised 1972). 
81 Tharmalingan v. Sambathan [1961] MLJ 63; Datuk Pasamanickam & Anor v. Agnes Joseph [1980]
2 MLJ 92; Govindaraj v. President, Malaysian Indian Congress & Anor [1984] 2 MLJ 190. 
82 [1985] 2 MLJ 130. 
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In this exception, the expression ‘scholarship’ includes any bursary to be 
awarded or tuition or examination fees to be defrayed by the Government and the 
expression ‘Government’ includes the Government of State. 
This exception gives effect to an ouster clause removing the court’s 
jurisdiction in matters affecting scholarships, including bursaries awarded by the 
Government. This provision places the Government in an advantageous position in 
its dealings with scholarship holder, an advantage not enjoyed by individuals and 
non-governmental organisations.83
3.12 Uncertain Contracts – Section 30 
Some contracts, though intended to be legally binding, are too vague to be 
enforced. Put another way, the court is faced with alternative constructions of the 
agreement advanced by the parties, but is unable to decide which, if either, is correct.
In these circumstances, it is better to hold that no contract has come into existence
rather than to risk imposing obligations on the parties to which they never assented.84
Hence, the terms of a contract cannot be vague but must certain. A contract which is 
uncertain or is not capable of being made certain is void, as provided in section 30 of 
the Contracts Act. For example, in Karuppan Chetty v. Suah Thian85, the requirement
of certainty was not met when the parties agreed upon the granting of a lease ‘at
$35.00 per month for as long as he likes’.
83 Vohrah, B. & Wu, Min Aun, “The Commercial Law of Malaysia.” (Malaysia: Longman, 2004), pp.
143.
84 Anderson, A.J.; Smith, S.B.; Palmer, N.E.; Cooper, R.R., “Emden’s Construction Law.” Volume 1.
8th Edition. (London: Butterworth, 1990), pp. 59. 
85 [1916] FMSLR 300. 
61
3.13 Wagering Contracts – Section 31 
In English law, wagering agreements are bets, and are rendered void by the 
Gaming Act 1845.86 At the time of the gaming or wagering contract such as the 
placing of a bet, the event or forecast is uncertain so that if it turns out one way, one 
party will lose and if it turns out the other, he will win. Neither of the parties has any 
other interest in the contract other than the stake he will win or lose. Unlike English 
law, local law does not make a distinction between wagering on games and other 
types of wager.87
Gaming and wagering contracts are specifically forbidden by statute. 
According to section 31(1) of the Contracts Act: - 
Agreements by way of wager are void; and no suit shall be brought for 
recovering anything alleged to be won on any wager, or entrusted to any person 
to abide the result of any game or other uncertain event on which any wager is 
made.
However the operation of the whole of section 31 is suspended by the application of 
section 26 of the Civil Law Act 195688, which reads: - 
(1) All contracts or agreements, whether by parol or in writing, by way of 
gaming or wagering shall be null and void. 
(2) No action shall be brought or maintained in any Court for recovering any 
sum of money or valuable thing alleged to be won upon any wager or which 
is been deposited in the hands of any person to abide the event on which any 
wager had been made. 
86 Elliott, C. & Quinn, F., “Contract Law.” 4th Edition. (London: Longman, 2003), pp. 186. 
87 Vohrah, B. & Wu, Min Aun, “The Commercial Law of Malaysia.” (Malaysia: Longman, 2004), pp. 
128.
88 Ibid, pp. 129. 
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CHAPTER 4 
VOIDABLE AND VOID CONSTRUCTION CONTRACTS 
4.1 Background 
In construction industry, all construction work is done within a contract 
except that done by a person for himself.1 The essence of a construction contract is 
that the contractor agrees to supply work and materials for the erection of a building 
or other works for the benefit of the employer. The design of the work to be carried 
out is often supplied by or on behalf of the employer, but may also be supplied in 
whole or in part by the contractor. In legal terms there is no difference between a 
building and an engineering contract, and the term Construction Contracts is adopted 
to cover both.2
Almost invariably there will be other parties involved in a construction 
contract in addition to the contractor and the employer. There may be an architect or 
engineer who provides the design and supervises the work; there may be a quantity 
1 Collier, K., “Construction Contracts.” 3rd Edition, (New Jersey: Merrill Prentice Hall, 2001), pp. 3. 
2 Uff, J., “Construction Law.” 5th Edition, (London: Sweet & Maxwell, 1991), pp. 152. 
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surveyor who controls the cost of the work; and there are likely to be sub-contractors 
employed to carry out part of the work. The involvement of these parties increases 
the complexity of a construction contract and sometimes, may also affect the validity
and voidability of a construction contract.
Hence, after reviewing the concepts of void and voidable contracts in the 
previous chapters, this chapter will identify and analyse the circumstances which will 
render a construction contract void or voidable. Those circumstances are based on 
decided court cases, which mainly were held under England law and laws in other
commonwealth countries.
4.2 Voidable Construction Contracts 
The followings are the circumstances identified through the analysis of 
courts’ judgements, which can render a construction contract voidable at the option
of the innocent parties. It is observed from the following court cases that almost all 
the innocent parties chose to claim damages from the parties in breach instead of 
rescind the contracts.
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4.2.1 Circumstance No. 1 - 
An employer, who has made fraudulent representations as to some material
fact (such as those shown in contract drawings), thereby induces a
contractor to submit a disadvantageous tender, the contract will be voidable
at the option of the contractor.3
Typically, a construction contract of any importance will contain a set of 
conditions of contract, a specification, a preamble, a bill of quantities, a set of 
drawings, and others documents of varying sorts. 4 If an employer has made a 
fraudulent representation as to some material fact in any documents mentioned,
thereby inducing a contractor to submit a disadvantageous tender, the contractor 
may, on discovering the fraud, rescind the contract and/or claim damages.5 These 
representations, which amount to fraud as provided in section 17 of the Contracts
Act, may be a suggestion which is not true and not believed by the employer to be 
true; or an active concealment of a fact by the employer who has knowledge of belief 
of the fact. It has been submitted in Bottoms v. York Corpn6 and Anglo-Scottish Beet
Sugar Corpn Ltd v. Spalding Urban District Council7 that the person making the 
representations is responsible where there is an intention to deceive the contractor.
In S Pearson & Son Ltd v. Dublin Corporation8, the contract plans showed a 
wall, which was intended to be used to support part of the work, as having
foundations nine feet below ordinance datum. There was a provision in the contract 
that the contractors must not rely upon any representation made in the plans, but 
must ascertain the facts for themselves. The wall did not extend to the depth shown, 
and after completing the contract (under an arrangement that such completion should 
be without prejudice to their claim) the contractors brought an action for deceit. The 
court found that the plans were prepared without any belief on the employer’s part as 
3 Archer v. Brown [1984] 2 All ER 267; Moss & Co Ltd v. Swansea Corpn [1910] 74 JP 351; Glasgow
and South Western Rly Co v. Boyd and Forrest [1915] AC 526. 
4 Uff, J., “Construction Law.” 5th Edition, (London: Sweet & Maxwell, 1991), pp. 156. 
5 Archer v. Brown [1984] 2 All ER 267; Moss & Co Ltd v. Swansea Corpn [1910] 74 JP 351; Glasgow
and South Western Rly Co v. Boyd and Forrest [1915] AC 526. 
6 [1892] 2 Hudson's BC (4th edn) 208. 
7 [1937] 3 All ER 335. 
8 [1907] AC 351. 
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to the truth of the stated depth. Thus, it was held that on the facts, there was evidence 
that the representation was fraudulent, and the provision was only intended to give 
protection against the honest mistakes made by the employer.
However, if the representations in the drawings are merely mistakes and not 
fraudulent, it may prevent the contract to be rendered voidable, provided also that 
there is a contractual exclusion in the contract, as per judgment in Edgeworth
Construction Ltd v. F Lea & Associates9. The Supreme Court in this case held that 
typical contractual exclusions in the road works contract successfully avoided any 
employer liability for errors in the drawings, but not a duty in tort owed by the 
engineers to the tendering contractors. Similarly to the bills of quantities in which the 
employer does not impliedly warrant that statements in bills of quantities are
accurate. In fact, the statements in bills of quantities are not representations that the 
work there described is sufficient for the completion of the contract.10
Bear in mind that should the aggrieved party continue to act upon the contract 
after he has discovered the fraud, he will normally be held to have abandoned his
right to rescission.11 In such circumstances, he cannot recover more than the contract 
price in an action for work and labour done.12
Therefore, from the above cases, a construction contract will be voidable at
the option of the contractor, if any fraudulent representations are found in any 
documents such as specification, bills of quantities, drawings, etc., which are 
forming part of the contract. However, if those representations in the contract 
drawings are merely mistakes, the employer may prevent the contract to become
voidable, provided he has inserted a contractual exclusion in the contract. 
9 [1993] 3 SCR 206. 
10 Sherren v. Fogg [1839] 5 M & W 83; Scrivener v. Pask [1866] LR 1 CP 715; Kimberley v. Dick
[1871] LR 13 Eq 1. 
11 Ormes v. Beadel [1860] 2 De G F & J 333; Leslie & Co v. Works Comrs [1914] 78 JP 462. 
12 Bristol Corpn v. John Aird & Co [1913] AC 241. 
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4.2.2 Circumstance No. 2 - 
Contract will be voidable at the option of the contractor if it is created based 
on the statements given by the employer, which are false or inaccurate due 
to employer’s negligence, to the contractors during the tender stage.13
In most large building contracts where bills of quantities or schedules of rates 
and plans are used, the contractor is expressly directed to verify the site conditions 
for himself, either in the body of the contract or in the bills. The effect of the 
foregoing is that, as stated by Anderson et al (1990), where such provisions are 
inserted, the contractor cannot rely on any statement in the bills to file an action 
based on misrepresentation unless it was fraudulent. This is despite the fact that in 
many cases the contractor is given only a very short period to price the bills for his 
tender, and cannot realistically be expected to verify for himself such matters as 
ground conditions.14
However, the provisions, which directing the contractors to verify certain 
information (especially those given by the employer) for themselves, may not always 
able to exclude employer’s liability and at the same time prevent the contract to be
voidable, as per judgment in Edgeworth Construction Ltd case in para 4.2.1. 
Conversely, it is submitted that particular words that are frequently used in contracts 
which have been assumed to exclude liability, may not necessarily sufficiently 
precise to achieve that purpose. 15 In other words, those inaccurate or untrue
statements given by the employer may amount to misrepresentations.
For instance, in an Australian case, Morrison-Knudsen International v. 
Commonwealth16 , clause 3(1) of the general conditions in the tender document
provided that the contractor should be deemed to have informed himself as to the site 
13 Morrison-Knudsen International v. Commonwealth [1972] ALJR 265. 
14 Anderson, A.J.; Smith, S.B.; Palmer, N.E.; Cooper, R.R., “Emden’s Construction Law.” Volume 1.
8th Edition. (London: Butterworth, 1990), pp. 123. 
15 Howard Marine and Dredging v Ogden [1978] QB 574. 
16 [1972] ALJR 265. 
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and local conditions affecting the carrying out of the contract. Under clause 4 of the
special conditions, the contractor acknowledged that he had satisfied himself as to 
the nature and location of the work ‘including the physical conditions of the site, the 
structure and condition of the ground; and any failure by the Contractor to acquaint 
himself with the available information is not to relieve him from responsibility for
estimating property any difficulty or cost of performing the work, and the employer 
assumes no responsibilities for any conclusions or stipulations made by the
Contractor on the basis of information made available by the employer’. Moreover,
a document entitled ‘Preliminary information for … tenderers’ expressly provided 
that the information in that document was not part of the tender or contract 
documents and was not to be binding on either the employer or the tenderer or the 
contractor. A similar exclusion was to be found in another document entitled 
‘Engineering Site Information’ which also was not to form part of the contract.
The contractor brought an action against the employer and alleged that the 
site information was inaccurate. The High Court of Australia, held that, on a 
preliminary point, none of the quoted provision was so worded as to be an effective 
disclaimer, if the duty of care indeed existed and the site information was inaccurate 
due to negligence as alleged. Hence in this case, even though there were disclaimers
and exclusions in the tender documents, the false statements contained would still 
amount to misrepresentation. This point was also considered by Hardie J. in 
Dillingham Construction v. Downs17, which stated that the particular words which 
are frequently found in civil engineering contracts and have been assumed to exclude 
liability are not necessarily sufficiently precise to achieve that purpose. 
In addition, in Cremdean Properties Ltd v. Nash18, an invitation to tender for
a development contained particulars as to the dimensions of certain property and the
amount of lettable office space. The accompanying notice stated that tenderers 
should satisfy themselves as to the correctness of the statements in the documents
and were not rely on them. The Court of Appeal held that a mere accompanying
17 [1972] 2 NSWR 49. 
18 [1977] 244 EG 547. 
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disclaimer would not by itself nullify what might ordinarily be regarded in the light
of all the circumstances as a representation intended to be acted upon.
In another situation, contractors may sometimes suspect or claim that the 
information given by the employers is not prepared in good faith. However, this 
statement may not be a good ground for a contractor to render a construction contract 
voidable at his option. In George Wimpey & Co v. Territory Enterprises 19 , a 
specification was made part of the contract documents in a civil engineering open-
cast mining contract. Under the heading ‘Responsibility to rest with the Contractor’,
clause 2 of the specification provided: - 
All information, plans, etc. supplied for this specification have been prepared in 
good faith and from information presently available to the Principal. The 
Contractor must accept full responsibility for the use of such information and 
should verify all information on the site … 
The following clause of the specification then provided information under a number
of different headings. Clause 13 of the general conditions of contract provided in 
sub-clauses (a) and (b) for the provision in good time during the work of prints and 
working drawings. In sub-clause 13(c) under the heading ‘Inaccuracy information
supplied by Principal’, it provided: - 
The Principal shall pay for any alterations of the work necessitated by inaccurate
information supplied by him or by the Engineer to the Contractor. This provision 
shall not apply to information … which is clearly stated to be tentative only. 
The contractor brought an action for breach of warranty alleging that the 
information supplied with the specification was not prepared in good faith from 
information at the time available to the principal. Alternatively, he claimed under 
clause 13(c). The Court held that: - 
19 [1971] 45 ALJR 38. 
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(a) The first sentence of clause 2 of the specification despite its inclusion in a 
contract document was a mere representation not intended to be promissory
or contractual; and 
(b) The clause 13(c) of the general conditions related to information supplied
after the date of the making of the contract under that clause and not to 
information supplied before the contract came into existence. 
Hence, the principal was not liable for the damages claimed by the contractor. 
It is important to note that, if a contractor continues to act upon a contract, 
after discovering that it contains false statements, he will lose his right to rescind by 
reason of his affirmation of the contract.20 The contractor will only be entitled to the
price agreed under that contract, as happened in the case of Glasgow and South 
Western Rly Co v. Boyd and Forrest21. In this case, the contractors, after two years 
they had completed a contract for a branch railway, they claimed rescission of the 
contract on the ground of innocent misrepresentation of the railway company’s
engineer as to the nature of the strata through which the railway passed. It was held 
that the claim failed on the ground that the contractors, by completing the contract
with full knowledge of the facts, had rendered restitutio in integrum22 impossible.
Hence, in view of the above, it can be summarised that statements given by 
an employer to a contractor, which are false or inaccurate due to employer’s
negligence, may render the contract between them voidable at the option of the 
contractor, provided the employer’s duty of care indeed exist. This circumstance
remains even though there are contractual exclusions inserted in the contract. 
Meanwhile, the contractor’s suspicion of honesty of the employer in preparing 
information may not be a good ground to render a contract voidable. Finally, a
contractor, who continues to act upon a contract after discovering that it contains
20 Ormes v. Beadel [1860] 2 De G F & J 333; Long v. Lloyd [1958] 2 All ER 402. 
21 [1915] AC 526. 
22 A maxim which means ‘restoration to the original position’ [as per Martin E. A., “Oxford
Dictionary of Law.” 5th Edition. (UK: Oxford University Press, 2003), pp. 431].
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false statements, will lose his right to rescind by reason of his affirmation of the
contract.
4.2.3 Circumstance No. 3 - 
A contract will be voidable at the option of the employer if it is created
based on the tender submitted by the contractor, who has taken advantage 
of the employer’s error during the tender stage.23
An employer, or his agents, may make certain mistakes when preparing 
tender documents for a construction project. If any tenderer takes advantage of those
mistakes when tender for such project, he is committing a fraudulent conduct, as 
submitted in the following case. This conduct may be a concealment of facts or 
creation of a promise which is not intended to be performed. Thus, a contract that is 
induced under this circumstance is voidable at the option of the employer, as 
provided in section 17 of the Contracts Act. 
In Monoghan County Council v. Vaughan24, the plaintiffs advertised inviting
tenders for the demolition of a workhouse. The advertisement did not make it clear 
whether it was intended that the contractor should be paid or make payments for the 
work, but the specifications showed that it was intended that he should offer to make
payments in his tender, as the materials were valuable. The defendant noticed the
ambiguity and took legal advice on the meaning of the specification, and then 
tendered as follows: ‘Tender for demolition of Clones Workhouse according to 
specifications, £1,200.’ The plaintiffs accepted this tender, and a formal contract was 
later executed providing clearly for payment by the plaintiffs to the defendant. The 
court held that the defendant had attempted to take advantage of the plaintiffs’ error 
and his conduct was dishonest and amounted to fraud. Thus the contract was 
voidable and could be rectified, as applied by the plaintiff.
23 Monoghan County Council v. Vaughan [1948] IR 306. 
24 [1948] IR 306. 
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4.2.4 Circumstance No. 4 - 
Contractor’s threat to terminate the original contract, without any legal
justification, unless the employer increase his payments under that 
contract, amounts to economic duress and thus the new contract created 
under such duress  is voidable at the option of the employer.25
Payments are always the factor of disputes between the employer and the 
contractor. A contractor may sometimes, due to certain reasons such as increase of 
wages, material price, etc., requests an employer to increase payment, which is
higher than the price agreed in the contract between them. This contractor, in fact, is
asking the employer to enter into a new contract with him with a new consideration
for him (i.e. the increased payment). However, the employer has a right not to accept 
such offer. If the employer is forced to enter into the new contract under the 
contractor’s threat to terminate the original contract, the new contract will be 
voidable at the option of the employer, This is provided in section 15 of the 
Contracts Act, which covers economic duress26, and also submitted in the following
case.
In North Ocean Shipping Co Ltd v. Hyundai Construction Co Ltd & Anor27,
the defendant, a shipbuilding contractor, entered into a contract by which they agreed 
to build a tanker for the plaintiffs, who were the ship owners, for a fixed price in 
United States dollars, and payment was to be made in five instalments. The 
defendant agreed to open a letter of credit to provide security for repayment of 
instalments in the event of their default in the performance of the contract. After the
plaintiffs had paid the first instalment, the United States dollar was devalued by 10% 
and the defendant put forward a claim to an increase of 10% in the remaining
instalments. The plaintiffs, asserting that there was no legal ground on which the 
claim could be made, paid the second and third instalments without the additional
10%, but the defendant returned both instalments. The plaintiffs suggested that the 
25 North Ocean Shipping Co Ltd v. Hyundai Construction Co Ltd & Anor [1978] 3 All ER 1170. 
26 Refer para 2.5.1 in Chapter 2. 
27 [1978] 3 All ER 1170. 
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defendant should subject their claim to arbitration, but they declined to do so, and 
requested the plaintiffs to give them a final and decisive reply to their demand for an
increase by a certain date, failing which they would terminate the contract.
The plaintiffs, who at that time were negotiating a very lucrative contract for
the charter of the tanker, replied that although they were under no obligation to make
additional payments, they would do so “without prejudice” to their rights, and
requested that the company arrange for corresponding increases in the letter of credit. 
The company agreed to do so in June 1973, and the plaintiffs remitted the remaining
instalments, including the 10% increase, without protest. The tanker was delivered to 
the plaintiffs in November 1974 but it was not until July 1975 that the company
knew that the plaintiffs were claiming the return of the extra 10% paid on the four
instalments with interest and the matter was referred to arbitration. The arbitrators 
stated a special case for the opinion of the court on a question of law. 
Mocatta J. in this case held, inter alia, that the defendant’s threat to break the 
contract without any legal justification unless the plaintiffs increased their payments
by 10% did amount to duress in the form of economic pressure and, accordingly, the 
agreement of June 1973 was a voidable contract which the plaintiffs could either 
affirm or avoid. 
Also, in an earlier and well-known American case, Watkins v. Carrick28, the 
contractor contracted to carry out excavation work but unexpectedly struck solid 
rock. He refused to proceed unless he was paid extra. It was held that the contractor
was not entitled for the additional payment. Furthermore, the court also held that the 
contractor had given no consideration for the employer’s promise of additional
payment. Consideration for the employer might exist if the contractor provides the
28 [1941] 121 Att (2d) 591. 
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employer with a genuine practical benefit,29 or there is uncertainty whether or not an 
item of work falls within the original contract.30
The contractor in this circumstance is committing an economic duress upon 
the employer and subsequently inducing a new contract. Hence, if a contractor
refuses to proceed with work unless he is paid at a higher rate than that previously
agreed, the employer is entitled to refuse payment except at the originally agreed
rate, and even avoid the contract. Moreover, if no consideration is given by the 
contractor to the employer in such situation, the new contract is void, as provided in 
section 26 of the Contracts Act.31
4.2.5 Circumstance No. 5 - 
A contractor who makes an untrue statement on its products in order to 
induce an employer to contract with him will render the contract voidable
at the option of the employer.32
Contractor who makes a positive assertion on its products, which is not
warranted by him and in fact not true, induces an employer to contract with him, is 
amounting to misrepresentation, as defined in section 18(a) of the Contracts Act. The 
contract in this circumstance will be voidable at the option of the employer. As in the 
case of Davis & Co (Wines) Ltd v. AFA-Minerva (E.M.I.) Ltd 33 , the plaintiff 
(employer) entered into negotiations with R, the sales manager of the defendant 
company (contractor), for the installation of a burglar alarm system at the plaintiff’s 
business premises. A contract was signed and the installation was completed in 1971. 
Subsequently burglars had entered the premises, when the premises were left 
unattended at a weekend. The control panel had been wrenched off and the wires
29 Williams v. Roffey Bros and Nicholls (Contractors) Ltd [1991] 1 QB 1; B and S Contracts and
Design Ltd v. Victor Green Publications Ltd [1987] ICR 419. 
30 Williams v. O’Keefe [1910] AC 186. 
31 Refer para 3.8 in Chapter 3. 
32 Davis & Co (Wines) Ltd v. AFA-Minerva (E.M.I.) Ltd [1974] 2 Lloyd's Rep 27; The Thomas
Saunders Partnership v. Harvey [1989] 30 ConLR 103. 
33 [1974] 2 Lloyd's Rep 27. 
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leading from it had been severed. The plaintiffs claimed damages from the
defendants on the ground of, inter alia, innocent misrepresentation under the
Misrepresentation Act 1967, in that R had told the plaintiff that any broken wire 
would cause the bell to ring until the batteries were exhausted, whereas in fact they 
stopped if the control panel was wrenched off. The court in this case held, inter alia,
that it was a misrepresentation by the defendant and hence he was liable for the
damages as claimed by the plaintiff. 
This circumstance may also happen to the contract of engagement for a 
professional by an employer, as illustrated by Anderson et al (1990). Suppose that an 
employer consults an architect in order to commission a design for a housing scheme
on a particular site, and asks in particular whether there are likely to be any
difficulties in disposing of the foul drainage. Without checking his facts, the architect 
tells the employer that the system can be taken into public sewer by gravity. As a
result of this statement, the employer buys the site and commissions the architect to 
prepare and submit a scheme. It transpires in fact that the site is too low in relation to 
the public sewer for a gravity system to be workable, and the local authority refuses
to adopt a pumped system. In such a situation, the architect’s original advice might
constitute a misrepresentation inducing his contract of engagement and the employer
might be entitled to rescind, even though he believed that his analysis of the situation 
was right at the time.
On the other hand, contractor may also suggest a fact, which is not true and 
not honestly believed by him to be true, to induce the employer to contract with him.
This conduct, whatever its motive, amounts to fraud, as defined in section 17(a) of 
the Contracts Act; or fraudulent misrepresentation under English law. Thus, this 
gives the employer a right in tort to damages for deceit, and a further right to elect
either to affirm the contract (when it will continue for both parties) or to rescind it.
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In The Thomas Saunders Partnership v. Harvey34, the plaintiffs were retained 
as architects in connection with the fitting out of new office premises, which 
included the need for raised access flooring in rooms where computers were to be 
installed. The defendant was one of two directors of a company to which the sub-
contract for the flooring was offered. He was asked whether the flooring conformed
to a specific standard and he confirmed that it did. However the flooring was later 
found to be inadequate causing considerable losses to the occupier of the premises.
The plaintiffs sought indemnity and/or contribution from the defendant arguing that 
he was liable in fraud and negligent misstatement. The court in this case held, inter
alia, that the defendant was liable in damages for fraud. 
In short, a contractor who makes an untrue statement on its products, 
regardless whether or not the contractor believes it to be true, in order to induce an
employer to contract with him will render the contract voidable at the option of the
employer.
4.2.6 Circumstance No. 6 - 
An employer, who does not disclose all material information to the 
contractors and subsequently induces a contract with a contractor, amounts 
to misrepresentation, and thus renders the contract voidable at the option of 
the contractor.35
In construction industry, it is frequently contended that employers owe a duty 
of disclosure to contractors, failing which it may cause the contracts between them 
become voidable at the option of the contractors. This is due to the absence of certain
information, which is purposely or recklessly not disclosed by the employer, may be
one of the main factors which induces the contractors to enter into the contract with 
34 [1989] 30 ConLR 103. 
35 Bank of Montreal v. Bail Ltee [1992] 93 DLR 4th 490; The Queen v. Walter Cabott Construction
Ltd [1975] 69 DLR (3d) 54. 
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the employer. The duty of disclosure may be approximate to the principle of utmost
good faith (uberrimae fidei), which is applicable to contracts of insurance.36
This circumstance is shown in a Canadian case, Bank of Montreal v. Bail 
Ltee37. Contractors, in this case, were engaged to carry out the excavation of an 
electricity sub-station, and encountered difficult soil condition some four months
after the main contract had been entered into. In fact, during the tender stage, the 
employers had commissioned an expert report which stated that the original design
was impractical. The report was not disclosed to the contractors. It was held by the 
Supreme Court of Appeal that, inter alia, there was a duty in a large project, where
changes were anticipated from time to time, to inform the contractors of relevant
information. Thus, the employers were liable for damages as claimed by the 
contractor and such contract was voidable at the option of the contractors. 
Similarly, in an earlier Canadian case, The Queen v. Walter Cabott
Construction Ltd 38 , a contractor tendered for a fish hatchery building and the 
drawings indicated with dotted lines ‘future’ fish way and holding ponds and rearing 
ponds nearby on the employer’s land. The contractor obtained the contract and 
during construction, discovered that contracts were about to be placed for the other 
structures on the employer’s land immediately adjoining the area of his own 
building, which would interfere with access and other aspects of the construction. He 
was advised in order to mitigate this to tender for one of the subsequent contracts,
and he accordingly made certain of obtaining it by putting in a higher bid than might
otherwise have been the case. He was in fact impeded by a third contract.
The Federal Court of Appeal, after reviewing the discussions and 
conversations, which had taken place between the contractor and the employer’s
representatives, held that no actionable representation had been made in respect of 
36 Refer para 2.3.2 in Chapter 2. 
37 [1992] 93 DLR 4th 490. 
38 [1975] 69 DLR (3d) 54. 
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the relevant contracts. Hence, the contract was not voidable. However, as stated by 
the judge in this case, an employer intending to place further contracts in the future,
which might affect the earlier contract, owed a duty of care not to withhold the 
material information and in the circumstances such a withholding of information
amounted to an actionable misrepresentation, which could render the contract 
voidable at the option of the contractor. 
Meanwhile, if the information provided by the employer contains any 
insufficiency, it may not be misrepresentation if the employer has, from the
beginning, informed the contractors that he does not possess complete information
for the work. In Atlas Construction Co Ltd v. City of Montreal39, a specification for
water works stated that the city did not possess complete information as to the 
location or occurrence of various existing structures, and disclaimed responsibility 
for the accuracy or completeness of the drawings. The tenderer was to visit the site
and not make any claim because of errors in the documents. In fact there were certain 
man-made under water obstructions not disclosed in the drawings and not actually 
known to the responsible municipal officers, although there were documents in the 
city archives showing the obstructions. Scott A.C.J. held that that there had been no 
misrepresentation. The plans and specifications were not misleading and the contract 
laid no duty on the city to give more information than it did. 
In circumstances which some of the material information is given by other 
tenderers or previous contractors, it may not amount to misrepresentation if the 
employer does not disclose that information to the contractors. In a case of United 
States, Morrison-Knudsen International v. State of Alaska40, the tenderers for an 
aircraft runway were required to obtain fill material for the sub-base from gravel in 
the bed of an adjoining lake. One tenderer rowed over the designated part of the lake, 
and observed that the material at the lake bottom included small boulders, which 
would require mechanical dredging, as opposed to cheaper suction dredger. He 
visited the engineer and requested that a new location be selected, where smaller
39 [1954] 4 DLR (2d) 124. 
40 [1974] 519 P (2d) 834. 
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material would permit suction dredging. The engineer eventually informed him that 
this would not be possible. When the ultimate successful tenderer started work and 
claimed compensation for the additional cost of mechanical dredging, the claim was
rejected. The successful tenderer was afterwards informed about the other tenderer 
who had made a correct appreciation for his pricing, whereupon the contractor 
claimed against the employer on the ground of breach of duty in failing to disclose
the information given to the engineer by the unsuccessful tenderer. 
It was held, by the Supreme Court of Alaska, that the employer owed no duty 
to disclose in such circumstances. The only duty of disclosure which the United 
States cases showed might exist would be where the State occupied so uniquely
favoured a position in relation to an item of information that no ordinary bidder in 
the position of the plaintiff could reasonably acquire the information in question 
without resort to the State, and in such a situation, the State could not rely upon a 
contractor’s failure to make an independent request for the information.
Also, in Lewis v. Anchorage Asphalt Paving Co41, an employer asked paving 
contractors to quote for supplying and laying hot asphalt paving on a sub-base in 
previously excavated streets which he had carried out himself. The paving 
subsequently failed because the employer’s previous contractor had used glacial fill
for the sub-base, which was liable to excessive expansion and contraction. The 
contractors had inspected the site before pricing the work, but claimed that there had 
been a duty by the employer to inform them of the nature of the fill used in the sub-
base. The court held that there was, following Morrison-Knudsen case, no duty of
disclosure by a private owner in such circumstances, and a trial was ordered to 
determine whether the contractors had been in breach of contract in not realising and 
warning the employer that the fill which he had used was unsuitable. 
41 [1975] P (2d) 1188. 
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From the above cases, it is shown that a contract will be voidable at the 
option of the contractor if the employer does not disclose all material information.
This material information does not include information provided by other tenderers
or previous contractors. Also, in case where the information provided by the 
employer contains any insufficiency, it may not be misrepresentation if the employer
has, from the beginning, informed the contractors that he does not possess complete
information for the work. 
4.3 Void Construction Contracts 
Circumstances that are able to be identified through the analysis of courts’ 
judgements, which can render a construction contract void, consist of the followings. 
4.3.1 Circumstance No. 1 - 
A contract will be void if the contractor or employer performs it in an 
illegal manner.42
In the context of construction law, there are cases where, although the 
contract is lawful in itself, it is capable of being carried out in an unlawful manner.
Generally, the courts will not enforce a contract at the instance of a party who, at the
time of contracting, intends to carry it out in an illegal manner or who participates in 
the illegal method of performance.43 For example, in Ashmore Benson Pease & Co 
Ltd v. A V Dawson Ltd44, a road haulage contractor undertook to transport equipment
using a vehicle which was illegally overloaded by that equipment, the contractor was
not able to enforce the contract against the equipment’s owner, as held by the court. 
42 Ashmore Benson Pease & Co Ltd v. A V Dawson Ltd [1973] 2 All ER 856. 
43 Anderson, A.J.; Smith, S.B.; Palmer, N.E.; Cooper, R.R., “Emden’s Construction Law.” Volume 1.
8th Edition. (London: Butterworth, 1990), pp. 58. 
44 [1973] 2 All ER 856. 
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The judge in this case further held that, where the owner’s agent was present at and 
aware of the overloading of the vehicle, the owner would not be permitted to recover
from the contractor should the equipment sustained damage in transit since he had, 
through his agent, participated in the illegal method of performance.
Difficulties arise when it is realised that had the haulage contractor in
question merely undertaken to transport the equipment and done so without mishap,
it is clear that he could recover the contract price for the haulage. This conclusion is 
required by the leading case of St John Shipping Corpn v. Jopseph Bank Ltd45, where 
a ship owner, during the performance of a contract for the carriage of goods by sea, 
overloaded his ship and thereby infringed statutory provisions, but he was held to be 
entitled to claim freight from the cargo owners. The distinction between these two
examples would seem to lie in the fact that in the road haulage case the court was 
being asked to give legal effect to intentionally wrongful acts in which the party 
seeking to recover had participated; while in the shipping case, the party who has
already benefited from the other party’s performance seeks to rely upon the illegality
of the manner of that performance to avoid having to perform his own lawful part of 
the contract. In the later case, the question for the court is whether the contract 
subsists, despite the illegality involved in its performance, so that the ‘innocent’
party remains obliged thereunder. This depends on the object ascribed to the law 
which has been breached. If the object of the law is primarily to penalise conduct 
rather than to invalidate contracts, the contract may be enforced.46
45 [1956] 3 All ER 683. 
46 Anderson, A.J.; Smith, S.B.; Palmer, N.E.; Cooper, R.R., “Emden’s Construction Law.” Volume 1.
8th Edition. (London: Butterworth, 1990), pp. 59. 
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4.3.2 Circumstance No. 2 - 
Construction works that are forbidden by law are illegal and thus render 
the construction contract void.47
A contract to perform an act, which is illegal at the time of the contract, is
void.48 In the field of construction contracts, the issue of illegality normally arises in
the context of compliance with statutory requirements such as building regulations 
and planning laws. Breaches of such statutory requirements normally constitute 
criminal offences and may affect the rights of parties to the contracts involved.49 In 
other words, an employer cannot seek to recover payments made under an illegal 
contract, nor can the contractor claim the contract price. For instance, in Stevens v. 
Gourley50, the contractor was unable to claim the payment because the building was 
built in timber when the use of such material was prohibited by law during that
period. Also, illegality may arise when attempts are made to deceive public 
authorities such as the Revenue.51
In the context of United Kingdom, building works cannot be carried out until 
a building license for the works is obtained from the Minister of Works.52 Thus, a
contractor cannot claim the value of work carried out in excess of that permitted by a 
license53, but if the employer expressly undertakes that he will obtain the necessary 
license and the contractor reasonably relies on the employer to do so, the contractor 
will have an action for breach of a collateral warranty should it prove that the
employer has failed to obtain an appropriate license.54
47 Stevens v. Gourley [1859] 7 CBNS 99. 
48 Per Holt C.J. in Bartlett v. Vinor [1692] Carth 251. 
49 Anderson, A.J.; Smith, S.B.; Palmer, N.E.; Cooper, R.R., “Emden’s Construction Law.” Volume 1.
8th Edition. (London: Butterworth, 1990), pp. 57. 
50 [1859] 7 CBNS 99. 
51 Miller v. Karlinski [1945] 62 TLR 85. 
52 “Halsbury’s Laws of Malaysia: Building & Construction Revenue.” Volume 3. (Malaysia: Malayan
Law Journal, 2002), pp. 94. 
53 Brightman & Co Ltd v. Tate & Anor [1919] 1 KB 463; Bostel Bros Ltd v. Hurlock [1948] 2 All ER
312; Dennis & Co. Ltd v. Munn [1949] 1 All ER 616; Woolfe v. Wexler [1951] 1 All ER 635; A.
Smith & Son (Bognor Regis) Ltd v. Walker [1952] 1 All ER 1008; Brewer Street Investments Ltd v.
Barclays Woollen Co Ltd [1953] 2 All ER 1330; Frank W Clifford Ltd v. Garth [1956] 2 All ER
323.
54 Strongman (1945) Ltd v. Sincock [1955] 3 All ER 90. 
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In Strongman (1945) Ltd v. Sincock55, building work had been done without 
the building license then required under the Defence (General) Regulations 1939 and 
the wording of reg 86A thereof, the effect that the execution of ‘any operation 
specified … shall be unlawful’ without such a license, was held to be sufficient to
render the contract unenforceable. Also, in A. Smith & Son (Bognor Regis) Ltd v. 
Walker56, by an agreement dated 20th April 1948, the plaintiffs contractors agreed to 
carry out certain demolition and building works on the defendant’s house. Before a
building licence, as required by the Defence (General) Regulations 1939, had been 
obtained the plaintiffs pulled down a wall of the house and re-built it. On 23rd April 
and 11th June 1948, the defendant paid to the plaintiffs two sums of £500. On 11th
and 30th June 1948, the plaintiffs obtained licences in respect of work on the rest of
the house authorising an expenditure of £3,200. The cost of the unlicensed work 
amounted to a sum of £1,700. The plaintiffs brought an action against the defendant 
to claim for the balance of the payments in respect of the work carried out. It was
held by Somervell L.J. that the payments by the defendant should be allocated in 
respect of the sums which the plaintiffs could lawfully claim, and, therefore, should 
be allocated to the licensed work. In other words, the contractors cannot seek to 
recover payments made under the unlicensed works, which was an illegal contract. 
There are two more cases decided in United Kingdom which involved the 
similar circumstances. In Bostel Bros Ltd v. Hurlock57, the court held, following the 
judgment in Brightman & Co Ltd v. Tate & Anor58, that the doing of additional 
works was a breach of the condition of the licence and therefore unlawful. 
Accordingly, the contractor was not entitled to recover their payment for those works 
due to the illegality of the contract created by the regulation, i.e. is the carrying out of
an operation without a licence. In contrary, shall the license for building works is 
valid, the works done within the limitation of the license will be legal and hence the 
contractors will be entitled to recover their payments for those works.59 Almost at the 
55 [1955] 3 All ER 90. 
56 [1952] 1 All ER 1008. 
57 [1948] 2 All ER 312. 
58 [1919] 1 KB 463. 
59 Woolfe v. Wexler [1951] 1 All ER 635. 
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same time, in Dennis & Co. Ltd v. Munn60, the plaintiffs (contractors) sued for the 
price of work done. However, under the Defence (General) Regulations 1939, the 
execution of building works was unlawful unless licensed by the Minister Works.
The plaintiffs carried out the work in the mistaken belief that there was a license in 
force but it was held that they could not recover for the value of the unlicensed work.
Nonetheless, under English law, where the consideration for the contract is 
substantially untainted by illegality, it will be enforced even though there may be a
subsidiary illegal element.61 Additionally, the court may grant one party a remedy in
respect of the part of the contract which could unlawfully be performed, provided the
value of the lawful part can be ascertained exactly.62 Under the Defence (General) 
Regulations 1939, reg 56A, for example, work costing more than £1,000 was 
unlawful unless licensed. However, it is different in the context of Malaysia. As
provided in section 25 of the Contracts Act, a contract is void even though only part 
of a single consideration is unlawful.63
In Frank W Clifford Ltd v. Garth64, the plaintiffs carried out work for the
defendants on a ‘cost-plus’ basis and the total value of the work executed was
£1,911. Although no license had been obtained for the excess, it was held that the
plaintiffs could recover for the value of the work done up to £1,000. Had the work 
not been carried out on a cost-plus basis, however, it seems the result would have
been otherwise. According to Denning L.J.65: - 
“If the builders had carried out a single and indivisible work, under an entire 
contract for a lump sum of, say £1,500 or £2,000, without a license, it would all 
have been illegal and the whole would have been irrecoverable.” 
60 [1949] 1 All ER 616. 
61 Bull v. Pitney Bowes Ltd [1966] 3 All ER 384. 
62 Anderson, A.J.; Smith, S.B.; Palmer, N.E.; Cooper, R.R., “Emden’s Construction Law.” Volume 1.
8th Edition. (London: Butterworth, 1990), pp. 83. 
63 Refer para 3.7 in Chapter 3. 
64 [1956] 2 All ER 323. 
65 British Reinforced Concrete Engineering Co Ltd v. Schelff & Anor [1921] 2 Ch 563. 
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Besides, in Towensends (Builders) Ltd v. Cinema News and Property
Management Ltd (David A Wilkie and Partners, third party) 66 , a contractor 
undertook to carry out certain work in accordance with a specification and under the 
supervision of an architect. The design of part of the work was such that it
contravened local byelaws relating to water closets but the contractor was 
nevertheless allowed for the cost of the work. Although the contractor was 
undoubtedly in breach of the byelaw and had therefore committed a criminal offence
and was liable to a fine, there was, in Lord Evershed’s words, “no fundamental 
illegality pervading the whole work and the whole contract”. It should be stressed 
that the contractor was well advanced with the work before he realised that the
design involved a breach of the byelaws, that the remedial work to comply with the 
byelaws was of a relatively minor nature and that local authority had decided not to 
enforce the byelaws during the occupation of the building by the sitting tenant. Those 
factors no doubt played a major part in Court of Appeal’s decision to regard the 
illegality as, in effect, a mere technicality. 
In short, building works that are forbidden by law or statutes will render a
construction contract void. For example, under English law, building works that are 
done without building license are unlawful and thus the construction contracts for 
those works are void. In Malaysia, unlike the context under English law, a 
consideration for the contract is still unlawful even though it is substantially
untainted by illegality.
66 [1959] 1 All ER 7. 
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4.3.3 Circumstance No. 3 - 
A contract, which does not define clearly and unambiguously the scope of 
work or obligations of the parties, is void.67
As defined in section 30 of the Contracts Act, a contract, which its meaning is 
not certain or not capable to be made certain, is void. This provision is also 
applicable to construction contracts. In construction contracts, the parties’ obligations 
are often not defined in detail in the main contract, but are contained in a mass of 
detailed plans, specifications, drawings and bills of quantities. Occasionally, these
various contract documents do not interrelate very clearly. For example, it may not
be clear whether the bills are to be measured by the engineering or building standard 
method of measurement, or whether an amended drawing forms part of the work, or 
whether a particular document is a contractual document at all. Normally the 
contract, if in one of the standard forms, will contain express provisions for resolving
such conflicts and difficulties. But where this is not the case, it may sometimes be 
difficult to hold that a contract exists.68
There are cases in construction contracts where the courts are unable to say 
what the contract means. For example, in Hart v. Georgia Railroad Co69 case, a
contractor undertook to erect a hotel in consideration of an undertaking by a railroad 
to ‘maintain and support the hotel by the patronage of its road’; the terms were held 
to be too uncertain to support a contract. Likewise, where the purchase price of land 
was to be paid by instalments and on payment of each instalment, a ‘proportionate
part’ of the land was to be conveyed, the alleged contract was again held void for 
uncertainty. This is because it was not clear how the proportionate parts were to be 
ascertained: whether by value, area, or other means.70 Also, in an old case of Ahmad
67 Hart v. Georgia Railroad Co [1983] 101 Ga 188; Ahmad Meah & Anor v. Nacodah Merican [1890]
4 Ky 583. 
68 Anderson, A.J.; Smith, S.B.; Palmer, N.E.; Cooper, R.R., “Emden’s Construction Law.” Volume 1.
8th Edition. (London: Butterworth, 1990), pp. 59. 
69 [1983] 101 Ga 188. 
70 Bushwall Properties Ltd v. Vortex Properties Ltd [1976] 2 All ER 283; British Steel Corpn v. 
Cleveland Bridge and Engineering Co Ltd [1984] 1 All ER 504. 
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Meah & Anor v. Nacodah Merican71, the court held that an agreement to build ‘a
suitable house’ was too ambiguous and vague to be a binding contract between the 
employer and the contractor. Thus the contract was void. 
4.3.4 Circumstance No. 4 - 
Contract is void when the both parties to the contract, i.e. the employer and 
the contractor, are in the mistaken belief that there is area available on site
to construct the buildings as specified in their contract.72
In this circumstance, both the employer and contractor, who are the parties to 
a contract, are under a mistake to a matter of fact essential to the contract. The
availability of area on site to construct the building, as agreed in the contract, is one 
of the essential matters of fact. Thus, as provided in section 21 of the Contracts Act,
the contract in such situation is void.73
In a local case, Goh Yew Chew & Anor v. Soh Kian Tee74, the appellant
contractor had undertaken to construct two buildings on land belonging to the
respondent employer. The sum of $5,000 was paid by the respondent to the 
appellants as earnest money. It was found that, owing to the encroachment of a 
neighbour’s house into the lot, there was not sufficient area to construct the buildings 
according to the plans. In his action the respondent claimed the return of the sum of 
$5,000 as money paid for a consideration which had failed.
The learned trial judge found that there had been no failure of consideration 
but that in the circumstances it was impossible ab initio to perform the contract. He 
held that the respondent was entitled to the balance of the deposit of $5,000 after 
deduction of all reasonable expenses incurred by the appellants. It was held by the 
71 [1890] 4 Ky 583. 
72 Goh Yew Chew & Anor v. Soh Kian Tee [1970] 1 MLJ 138. 
73 Refer para 3.2 in Chapter 3. 
74 [1970] 1 MLJ 138. 
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Federal Court, inter alia, that both parties, who entered into the contract believing in
good faith that it was possible for the two shop-houses to be constructed on the 
proposed site, were mistaken as to the area available.
However, a paramount importance should be attached to those characteristics 
of the matter of fact which the parties to the contract regarded as crucially significant 
to their decision to contract. In other words, if the mistake to a matter of fact is not 
crucially significant enough, it may not render a contract void. For instance, in A L
Gullinson & Sons v. Corey75, it was held that no mistake sufficient to nullify consent 
arose where both the employer and contractor erroneously believed that the plans, 
which were being used for the construction of a house, would produce a result of 
identical appearance to an already-existing house. 
4.3.5 Circumstance No. 5 - 
There is no consideration for an agreement, for a contractor not to sue for 
the balance, in acceptance the part payment from the employer of an 
existing debt, and thus the agreement is void.76
Consideration is one of the basic elements necessary to constitute a legally
enforceable contract. A contract without consideration is void, as provided in section 
26 of the Contracts Act. 77 Generally in construction contracts, the question of
consideration does not arise. The consideration provided by the contractor in 
carrying out the work and by the employer in paying the price need little comment.78
But there are occasions when the doctrine of consideration may cause difficulties, as
suggested by Anderson et al (1990). One of the occasions is, as a general rule in 
English law, the part payment of an existing debt is no consideration for a promise
not to sue for the balance. 
75 [1980] 29 NBR (2d) 86. 
76 D and C Builders Ltd v. Rees[1965] 3 All ER 837. 
77 Refer para 3.8 in Chapter 3. 
78 Anderson, A.J.; Smith, S.B.; Palmer, N.E.; Cooper, R.R., “Emden’s Construction Law.” Volume 1.
8th Edition. (London: Butterworth, 1990), pp. 83. 
88
In D and C Builders Ltd v. Rees79, the plaintiff contractors carried out works 
for the defendant employer to the value of £483. The defendant delayed payment and 
ultimately, knowing the plaintiffs were in financial straits, offered to pay £300 in full 
settlement. The Court of Appeal held that the plaintiffs were not debarred, by their 
acceptance of this lower amount, from suing for the balance. 
Nevertheless, there are some differences to the doctrine of consideration 
between the Malaysian law and the English law.80 In Malaysia, part payment for an 
exiting debt is allowed as long as the creditor is satisfied with the amount of the
payment. This rule is provided in section 64 of the Contracts Act, which reads: - 
Every promise may dispense with or remit, wholly or in part, the performance of 
the promise made to him, or may extend the time for such performance, or may 
accept instead of it any satisfaction which he thinks fit.
Illustration (b) of section 64 shows an example for this rule: - 
A owes B RM5,000. A pays to B, and B accepts, in satisfaction of the whole debt,
RM2,000 paid at the time and place at which the RM5,000 were payable. The 
whole debt is discharged. 
Hence, in this circumstance, a construction contract is void, if it is executed
under English law, or otherwise enforceable, if it is executed under Malaysian law.
79 [1965] 3 All ER 837. 
80 Salleh Buang, “Undang-Undang Kontrak Di Malaysia.” (Kuala Lumpur: Central Law Book, 1992),
pp.78.
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4.3.6 Circumstance No. 6 - 
When one party is mistaken as to the very terms of the contract, and this 
mistake is known to the other party, the contract is void.81
As illustrated by Anderson et al (1990) for the above circumstance, where 
parties to a proposed building contract negotiate at a price of, say £5 million, but the 
contractor’s clerk inadvertently types a figure of £500 thousand in the tender, the 
contractor may be entitled to avoid a contract grounded upon a purported acceptance 
of the tender at the lower figure, provided that the employer was, at the time of his
purported acceptance, aware of the mistake. This follows the principle in the leading
case, Hartog v. Colin and Shields82. In this case, a contract was made to sell goods at
a stated price per pound. Negotiations had taken place on the basis of a price fixed by
reference to a price per piece, which was the custom in trade. The value of the piece 
was about one-third that of a pound. The contract was held to be void, the court 
emphasising that the buyers were aware of the sellers’ mistake in terms of their offer.
On the other hand, if the employer does not aware of the mistake, the 
contractor would certainly failed in any attempt to avoid his contract simply on the
ground that he had wrongly priced his bills. As stated in section 23 of the Contracts 
Act, ‘a contract is not voidable merely because it was caused by one of the parties to 
it being under a mistake as to a matter of fact’. So much is plain from Page v.
Taunton Urban District Council 83 . There, in a contract for the construction of 
sewerage works, it was agreed that the different classes of work should be paid for 
not by a lump sum, but at so much per yard or foot, etc. The plaintiff, in filling in a
schedule of prices, inserted £18 per cwt for cast iron pipes (the correct price would 
have been about 18s or less. The engineer did not notice the high price for this detail 
until a considerable amount of the work had been executed. He thereupon 
endeavoured to force the plaintiff to do it at 18s and he refused to certify for a higher
rate. Upon the plaintiff’s refusing to do the work at 18s per cwt, the defendants 
81 Hartog v. Colin and Shields [1939] 3 All ER 566. 
82 [1939] 3 All ER 566. 
83 [1904] Hudson’s BC (7th edn) 126. 
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instructed their engineer to order as little as possible of this work. Eventually, on 
completion, the plaintiff sued for the balance due including, inter alia, the difference 
between the 18s he had been paid and £18, the schedule price. The defendant pleaded 
that there had been an operative mistake. It was held, however, that cross-
examination of the plaintiff as to the value of the cast iron pipes, which he admitted
he could have purchased at about 12s per cwt, was irrelevant on the ground that the 
contract was in writing and unambiguous. Also, it was too late for the defendants to 
seek to rectify the contract after they had affirmed it by instructing their engineer to 
order as little as he could of this detail. 
In situation where a contractor, after submitting his tender for a construction
project and before the date of tender opening, realises that he has priced wrongly to 
the tender, he is entitled to withdraw his tender at any time before the time fixed for
opening tenders, but thereafter forfeiting his deposit or entitling the employer to 
damages 84 should he subsequently withdraw or fail to enter into a formal
construction contract when required to do so.85 In City of Calgary v. Northern 
Construction86, an employee of the defendant contractor attended the opening, and 
was informed that his bid was the lowest by $395,000. The contractor informed the 
plaintiff employer on the same day that he had inadvertently omitted to add into his 
tender a sum of $181,000 representing some of his own work, and he ultimately
refused to complete the agreement unless the price was raised by $181,000. The
employer sued for damages (which as it happened were less than the amount of the 
deposit). The Court of Appeal held that there was a breach of the earlier tender
contract and that disposed of the matter and entitled the employer to recover the 
difference between the higher tender, which it ultimately placed, and that of the
contractor.
84 Besides the tender deposit, in Malaysia scenario, the tenderers are also required, in some private 
developments, to submit Earnest Money for a specific sum in the form of Bank Guarantee in favour
of the employer and shall be valid for a period (usually 90 days) from the date of tender. The
Earnest Money will be forfeited in the event the tenderer refuses to sign a contract after his tender
has been accepted, or withdraws his tender before the validity period expires. 
85 Wallace, I.N.D., “Hudson’s Building & Engineering Contracts.” 11th Edition, Volume 1, (London:
Sweet & Maxwell, 1995), pp. 55. 
86 [1986] 2 WWR 426. 
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In view of the above, it can be concluded that a construction contract is void 
if one party is mistaken as to the very terms of the contract, and this mistake is 
known to the innocent party. But, this contract will not be void if the innocent party 
does not aware the mistake. Consequently, the innocent party will be entitled to 
damages or other relieves shall the party in default insist to terminate the contract, or 
fail to enter into a formal contract with the innocent party.  
Chapter 5 
Conclusion & 
Recommendation
CHAPTER 5 
CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATION 
5.1 Introduction 
This is the final chapter which summarizes the finding of the research in 
accordance with the research objective. Problems encountered during the research as 
well as the recommendations of future research are also discussed in this chapter. 
5.2 Summary of Research Findings 
In general, the objective of this research has been achieved through the 
documentary analysis of law journals. By carrying out this research, six (6) 
circumstances have been identified which may render a construction contract 
voidable; and at the same time, another six (6) circumstances have been identified 
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which may render a construction contract void. The findings are summarised in 
Table 5.1 and Table 5.2, as follow: - 
Table 5.1: Circumstances Which Render a Construction Contract Voidable 
Item Circumstances Remarks
1. An employer, who has made fraudulent 
representations as to some material fact 
(such as those shown in contract 
drawings), thereby induces a contractor 
to submit a disadvantageous tender, the 
contract will be voidable at the option of 
the contractor. 
Discussed court cases: - 
?? Bottoms v. York
?? Anglo-Scottish Beet Sugar v. Spalding 
UDC
?? S Pearson v. Dublin
?? Edgeworth Construction v. F Lea &
Associates
??If the representations in the drawings 
are merely mistakes and not fraudulent, 
it may prevent the contract to be 
rendered voidable, provided also that 
there is a contractual exclusion in the 
contract.
??Employer does not impliedly warrant 
that statements in BQ are accurate. 
??Should the aggrieved party continue to 
act upon the contract after he has 
discovered the fraud, he will be held to 
have abandoned his right to rescission. 
In such circumstances, he cannot 
recover more than the contract price in 
an action for work and labour done. 
2. Contract will be voidable at the option of 
the contractor if it is created based on the 
statements given by the employer, which 
are false or inaccurate due to employer’s
negligence, to the contractors during 
tender stage. 
Discussed court cases: - 
??Morrison-Knudsen International v. 
Commonwealth
??Cremdean Properties v. Nash
??George Wimpey v. Territory 
Enterprises
??Glasgow and South Western Rly  v. 
Boyd and Forrest
??If a contractor suspect or claim that the 
information given by the employers is 
not prepared in good faith, it may not 
be a good ground for him to render a 
construction contract voidable at his 
option.
??If a contractor continues to act upon a 
contract, after discovering that it 
contains false statements, he will lose 
his right to rescind by reason of his 
affirmation of the contract. 
3. A contract will be voidable at the 
option of the employer if it is created 
based on the tender submitted by the 
contractor, who has taken advantage of 
the employer’s error during the tender 
stage.
Discussed court cases: - 
??Monoghan CC v. Vaughan
??The contractor’s conduct is 
amounting to fraud, and it may be 
concealment of facts or creation of a 
promise which is not intended to be 
performed. Thus, the contract is 
voidable at the option of the 
employer, as provided in section 17 
of the Contracts Act. 
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Item Circumstances Remarks
4. Contractor’s threat to terminate the 
original contract, without any legal 
justification, unless the employer
increase his payments under that 
contract, amounts to economic duress 
and thus the new contract created under 
such duress  is voidable at the option of 
the employer.
Discussed court cases: - 
??North Ocean Shipping v. Hyundai 
Construction
??Watkins v. Carrick
??The contractor, in fact, is asking the 
employer to enter into a new contract 
with him with a new consideration for 
him (i.e. the increased payment).
??If the employer is forced to enter into 
that new contract, it will be voidable at 
the option of the employer.
??The contractor has also given no 
consideration for the employer’s
promise of additional payment, unless 
the employer is provided with a 
genuine practical benefit or there is 
uncertainty whether or not an item of 
work falls within the original contract. 
5. A contractor who makes an untrue 
statement on its products in order to 
induce an employer to contract with him
will render the contract voidable at the 
option of the employer.
Discussed court cases: - 
??Davis v. AFA-Minerva (E.M.I.) 
??The Thomas Saunders v. Harvey
??Contractor who makes a positive 
assertion on its products, which is not 
warranted by him and in fact not true, 
induces an employer to contract with 
him, amounts to misrepresentation.
??Contractor who suggests a fact, which 
is not true and not honestly believed by
him to be true, induces the employer to 
contract with him, amounts to fraud. 
6. An employer, who does not disclose all 
material information to the contractors 
and subsequently induces a contract with 
a contractor, amounts to 
misrepresentation, and thus renders the 
contract voidable at the option of the 
contractor.
Discussed court cases: - 
??Bank of Montreal v. Bail Ltee 
??The Queen v. Walter Cabott 
??Atlas Construction v. City of Montreal
??Morrison-Knudsen International v. 
State of Alaska
??Lewis v. Anchorage Asphalt Paving
?? If the information provided by the 
employer contains any insufficiency,
it may not be misrepresentation if the 
employer has, from the beginning, 
informed the contractors that he does 
not possess complete information for 
the work. 
?? If part of the material information is 
given by other tenderers or previous 
contractors, it may not amount to 
misrepresentation if the employer does 
not disclose that information to the 
contractors.
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Table 5.2: Circumstances Which Render a Construction Contract Void 
Item Circumstances Remarks
1. A contract will be void if the contractor 
or employer performs it in an illegal 
manner.
Discussed court cases: - 
??Ashmore Benson Pease v. A V 
Dawson
??St John Shipping v. Jopseph Bank
??If the object ascribed to the law, which 
has been breached, is primarily to 
penalise conduct rather than to 
invalidate contracts, the contract may
be enforced. 
2. Construction works that are forbidden 
by law are illegal and thus render the 
construction contract void. 
Discussed court cases: - 
??Stevens v. Gourley
??Strongman v. Sincock
??A. Smith & Son v. Walker
??Bostel Bros v. Hurlock
??Dennis v. Munn
??Frank W Clifford v. Garth
??Towensends (Builders) v. Cinema 
News and Property Management
??In English law, where the 
consideration for the contract is 
substantially untainted by illegality, it 
will be enforced even though there 
may be a subsidiary illegal element.
??In Malaysia, as provided in section 25 
of the Contracts Act, a contract is void 
even though only part of a single 
consideration is unlawful. 
3. A contract, which does not define 
clearly and unambiguously the scope of 
work or obligations of the parties, is 
void.
Discussed court cases: - 
??Hart v. Georgia Railroad
??Ahmad Meah v. Nacodah Merican
??Parties’ obligations in construction 
contracts are often not defined in detail 
in the main contract, but are contained 
in a mass of detailed plans, 
specifications, drawings and bills of 
quantities.
??Occasionally, these various contract 
documents do not interrelate very
clearly.
4. Contract is void when the both parties to 
the contract, i.e. the employer and the 
contractor, are in the mistaken belief 
that there is area available on site to 
construct the buildings as specified in 
their contract. 
Discussed court cases: - 
??Goh Yew Chew v. Soh Kian Tee
??A L Gullinson & Sons v. Corey
??Both the employer and contractor, are 
under a mistake to a matter of fact 
essential to the contract, and the 
availability of area on site to construct 
the building, as agreed in the contract, 
is one of the essential matters of fact. 
??A paramount importance should be 
attached to those characteristics of the 
matter of fact which the parties to the 
contract regarded as crucially
significant to their decision to contract. 
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Item Circumstances Remarks
5. There is no consideration for an 
agreement, for a contractor not to sue for 
the balance, in acceptance the part 
payment from the employer of an 
existing debt, and thus the agreement is 
void.
Discussed court cases: - 
??D and C Builders v. Rees
??In this circumstance, a construction 
contract is void, if it is executed under 
English law, or otherwise enforceable, 
if it is executed under Malaysian law.
??In Malaysia, part payment for an 
exiting debt is allowed as long as the 
creditor is satisfied with the amount of 
the payment, as provided in section 64 
of the Contracts Act. 
6. When one party is mistaken as to the 
very terms of the contract, and this 
mistake is known to the other party, the 
contract is void. 
Discussed court cases: - 
??Hartog v. Colin and Shields
??Page v. Taunton UDC
??City of Calgary v. Northern 
Construction
??If the employer does not aware of the 
mistake, the contractor would certainly
fail to avoid his contract simply on the 
ground that he had wrongly priced his 
bills.
??Where a contractor, after submitting
his tender and before the date of tender 
opening, realises that he has priced 
wrongly to the tender, he is entitled to 
withdraw his tender the date of tender 
opening, but thereafter forfeiting his 
deposit or entitling the employer to 
damages should he subsequently
withdraw or fail to enter into a formal
construction contract when required to 
do so. 
5.3 Problem Encountered During Research 
Constraint and insufficiency of time was the main and only problem 
encountered when writing up the report for this research. Only eight (8) weeks’ time
was available for this research and hence every process has been carried out in a very 
fast manner, especially during the data collection process, which involved collecting
and sorting court cases from different law journals. This limitation led to less cases
being found to support the findings, especially those cases decided in Malaysia 
courts. If there were more time given, most probably the circumstances illustrated
will be more comprehensive and thorough. 
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5.4 Further Studies
The followings are some possible fields related to this research recommended 
for future research: - 
a) The validity of construction contracts in Malaysia. – This research is slightly
different from the current research and aims to identify the factors and 
circumstances which may affect the validity of a construction contract in the 
context of Malaysia’s construction industry.
b) The legal positions of the parties in voidable construction contracts – This 
research will mainly focus on the legal positions of the parties in construction
industry, such as the employers, contractors, professionals and suppliers, 
when their contracts are voidable. 
c) Void and voidable sale and purchase contracts – The objective of this 
research is to identify the circumstances which may render a sale and 
purchase contract void and voidable. This research may be limited to 
contracts between developer and purchaser, land owner and purchaser, and 
land owner and developer. 
5.5 Conclusion 
As a conclusion for this research, there are factors that will cause a contract
void or voidable, which have been provided in the Contracts Act in Malaysia,
Misrepresentation Act 1967 in United Kingdom, and other statutes or laws. These 
factors have been discussed by reviewing theories of different authors and 
demonstrating decided court cases of different countries. However, in construction 
industry, due to its complexity and unique characteristic, there are circumstances
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which may result such factors to exist in a construction contract, and subsequently 
may lead the contract to become void or voidable. Hence, this research was carried 
out and due to time constraint, there were twelve (12) circumstances, which may 
render a construction contract void or voidable, able to be identified. This research 
perhaps is not comprehensive, the author hopes that it may provides some rough 
ideas or guidelines for the parties in the construction industry in determining whether 
or not a construction contract is void, or voidable. 
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